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I. INTRODUCTION
Nationwide injunctions are broad, enjoining defendants from engaging in
particular acts both in and outside of the geographic territory of the issuing court and
often govern the defendants’ conduct as to both parties and nonparties.1 The remedy
has been part of federal practice for at least a century, and for much of its history has
been both rarely awarded and normatively unproblematic.2
Public narratives about nationwide injunctions shifted dramatically at the tail end
of the Obama administration and public outcry reached a fever pitch under the Trump
administration. With increasing frequency, federal district courts issued nationwide
injunctions enjoining federal programs, rules, and policies in cases touching on the
most heated political issues of the day—immigration,3 contraception,4 transgender
rights,5 and labor,6 to name a few. This spurred outcries that lone wolf activist federal
judges are running roughshod over the rule of law.7

1 Amanda Frost, In Defense of Nationwide Injunctions, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1065, 1071 (2018)
(defining the remedy); see also Portia Pedro, Toward Establishing a Pre-Extinction Definition
of “Nationwide Injunctions,” 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 847, 867–68 (2020) (taking a critical view
of alternative definitions of the remedy percolating in scholarly literature).
2 See discussion infra Section II.A.
3 See, e.g., E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 932 F.3d 742, 755 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming
nationwide injunction against regulation establishing additional limits and conditions rendering
certain aliens ineligible for asylum); Regents of the Univ. of Cal. v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland
Sec., 908 F.3d 476, 486 (9th Cir. 2018) (affirming nationwide injunction against government’s
rescission of the Deferred Action for Childhood Arrivals (DACA) program based in part on
“the need for uniformity in immigration policy”), rev’d in part and vacated in part, 140 S. Ct.
1891 (2020); Texas v. United States, 809 F.3d 134, 146 (5th Cir. 2015) (affirming nationwide
preliminary injunction against government’s expansion of DACA), aff’d by equally divided
court, 136 S. Ct. 2271 (2016) (Mem.).
4 See, e.g., Pennsylvania v. Trump, 351 F. Supp. 3d 791, 798 (E.D. Pa. 2019), aff’d sub nom.
Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019), cert. granted sub nom. Trump v.
Pennsylvania, 140 S. Ct. 918 (2020) (Mem.); see also California v. Health & Human Servs.,
351 F. Supp. 3d 1267, 1271 (N.D. Cal. 2019), aff’d sub nom. California v. U.S. Dep’t of Health
& Human Servs., 941 F.3d 410 (9th Cir. 2019), vacated sub nom., Little Sisters of the Poor
Jeane Jugan Residence v. California, 141 S. Ct. 192 (2020) (Mem.).
5 Texas v. United States, 201 F. Supp. 3d 810, 836 (N.D. Tex. 2016) (O’Connor, J.) (enjoining
federal enforcement of Title VII and Title IX’s sex discrimination proscriptions as to
transgender workers and students); Franciscan All., Inc. v. Burwell, 227 F. Supp. 3d 660, 670
(N.D. Tex. 2016) (O’Connor, J.) (enjoining provision of Obama-era Department of Health and
Human Services regulation defining sex discrimination to reach “gender identity”).
6 See, e.g., Nevada v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 321 F. Supp. 3d 709, 713 (E.D. Tex. 2018) (holding
nonparty employee and counsel in contempt after they brought separate action to recover
overtime wages based on earlier issued nationwide injunction against the same regulation),
rev’d sub nom. Texas v. U.S. Dep’t of Lab., 929 F.3d 205 (5th Cir. 2019).
7 See, e.g., Nicholas Bagley & Samuel Bray, Judges Shouldn’t Have the Power to Halt Laws
ATLANTIC
(Oct.
31,
2018),
Nationwide,
THE
https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2018/10/end-nationwide-injunctions/574471/
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Recently, critics of the nationwide injunction have argued that the remedy is
unconstitutional. Their argument comes in two parts. First, they insist nationwide
injunctions are inherently problematic because, among other things, they incentivize
forum- and judge-shopping, can give rise to conflicting injunctions and orders,
impinge nonparty rights, depress percolation of issues in lower courts, and weaken the
certiorari process. Second, they urge that these problems arise because nationwide
injunctions violate any of three supposed limits on Article III’s equity—the remedy is
beyond the powers of the English Chancellor at the time the Constitution was ratified
in 1789, broader than traditionally permitted because it affects the rights of nonparties, or is otherwise antithetical to federal equity tradition.8 The common thread of
these attacks is that the nationwide injunction’s supposed novelty gives rise to
problems that are otherwise inexplicable and necessarily renders the remedy
illegitimate.
The historical argument is perhaps most infamously espoused by Samuel Bray in
his article Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction.9 Pointing to
Justice Antonin Scalia’s majority opinion in Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v.
Alliance Bond Fund, Inc.,10 Bray argues that the metes and bounds of the equity
powers vested in Article III judges are limited to those traditionally exercised by the

[https://perma.cc/2TMP-XR23] (“National injunctions are equal-opportunity offenders. . . .
[T]he United States is a fractious, complicated democracy, and it’s disconcerting how much
authority we’ve ceded to lone, unelected judges.”); Joseph Digenova, Governance by Court
injunction is No Way to Run a Country, L.A. TIMES (Dec. 4, 2018),
https://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-digenova-federal-injunctions-20181204story.html (“The spate of judicial bullying has laid bare a major structural problem with our
federal courts: When nationwide injunctions are too easily obtained, the country is essentially
ruled by a judicial dictatorship. . . . This isn’t about politics; it’s about returning the courts to
their proper constitutional role. The executive branch cannot function if activist lawyers—
without winning a single election—can set policy for months or years just by shopping around
for a federal judge sympathetic to their cause.”); Associated Press, Federal Judge Orders Halt
to ‘Don’t Ask, Don’t Tell’ Enforcement, FOX NEWS (Oct. 12, 2010),
https://www.foxnews.com/politics/federal-judge-orders-halt-to-dont-ask-dont-tellenforcement [https://perma.cc/X2X7-JKBL] (“For a single federal judge to tell the government
to stop enforcing this policy worldwide, this afternoon, with no time to think about it or plan for
it, is almost unprecedented.” (quoting Richard Socarides, former Clinton White House adviser
on gay rights)).
8 Michael Dorf has characterized this “antiquarian objection” as “ridiculous.” Michael C. Dorf,
Promo for My Travel Ban Column—And a Thought About Justice Thomas’s Potshot at
ON
L.
(June
27,
2018),
Nationwide
Injunctions,
DORF
http://www.dorfonlaw.org/2018/06/promo-for-my-travel-ban-column-and.html
[https://perma.cc/R9CF-B3VP].
9 See generally Samuel Bray, Multiple Chancellors: Reforming the National Injunction, 131
HARV. L. REV. 417 (2017).
10 See generally Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308
(1999).
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English Chancellor at the turn of the eighteenth century.11 That is, on a purportedly
originalist account, Bray construes Article III to vest federal courts with equity powers
concomitant with those of the English Chancellor at the time of ratification of the
Constitution. At that point in time, Bray contends, because the English Chancellor was
unitary—there was only one chancellor, not multiple—the Chancellor had no need
and thus no power to issue anything like the overlapping and sometimes conflicting
nationwide injunctions we see today.12 Then, focusing narrowly on American federal
equity practice, Bray claims that because nationwide injunctions did not issue before
the 1960s, their recent lineage evidences they are a perversion of traditional equity
powers.13
Other commentators simply conclude that the problems concomitant to the power
to issue nationwide injunctions—forum shopping, competing injunctions, stifling the
percolation of issues before they reach the Supreme Court, to name a few—weigh
against legitimating them as proper exercises of remedial equity power.14 Some split
the baby and simply suggest that we tame the nationwide injunction by prescribing
formal limits on issuance, implying that if federal trial judges had more rigid guides
fewer purportedly problematic injunctions would issue.15
There are some defenders of the nationwide injunction. Most in this camp insist
that the broad reach of nationwide injunctions is a necessary remedy in exceptional
cases. For instance, Amanda Frost and Suzette Malveaux separately argue that certain
issues are of such national import that cross-jurisdictional relief is necessary.16 Most
defenders of the remedy focus narrowly on why it is needed, rather than whether it is
within the jurisdiction and powers of our federal chancellors.17 For example, civil

11 Bray, supra note 9, at 425 (“The equitable doctrines and remedies of the federal courts must
find some warrant in the traditional practice of equity, especially as it existed in the Court of
Chancery in 1789.”).
12 Id. at 446–48.
13 Id. at 467–69.
14 See, e.g., Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal”
Injunctions and They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 363–65 (2018).
15 Zayn Siddique, Nationwide Injunctions, 117 COLUM. L. REV. 2095, 2139–47 (2017)
(suggesting an amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 that would codify the “complete relief
principle”); Matthew Erickson, Note, Who, What, Where: A Case for a Multifactor Balancing
Test As a Solution to Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 359–60 (2018)
(arguing that courts should adopt a three-factor test that takes into account “who” benefits from
injunction sought and if there are a large number of nonparty beneficiaries a nationwide
injunction is improper).
16 Frost, supra note 1, at 1090–94; Suzette M. Malveaux, Class Actions, Civil Rights, and the
National Injunction, 131 HARV. L. REV. F. 56, 64 (2018).
17 One notable exception is Mila Sohoni. In her Harvard Law Review article, Sohoni argues
that the remedy has been unfairly categorized as novel. Mila Sohoni, The Lost History of the
“Universal Injunction,” 133 HARV. L. REV. 920, 924 (2020). Even if “traditional” practice
limits federal equity, Sohoni points out that the Supreme Court and lower courts have issued
injunctions that reach beyond the plaintiff, including injunctions against the enforcement of
federal law, for more than a century. While Sohoni’s work has uncovered a useful historical
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rights lawyers, like Spencer Amdur and David Hausman, point out that the serious
injuries that typically give rise to suits seeking nationwide injunctions can only be
prevented if sweeping relief is afforded.18
The Supreme Court has had the opportunity to speak to the propriety of nationwide
injunctions on several occasions.19 But a recent exchange between Justices Gorsuch
and Sotomayor in early 2020 suggests the Court is poised to soon decide whether
nationwide injunctions are constitutional.

record that refutes the empirical novelty critique of nationwide injunctions, it does not explain
why the novelty critique strikes a chord with critiques of the remedy let alone how it operates
in the current political climate. This Article endeavors to build off of Sohoni’s work and tackle
those exact questions.
18 Spencer E. Amdur & David Hausman, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131
HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 51–53 (2017).
19 See, e.g., Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2393, 2423 (2018) (reversing on the merits a lower
court decision finding the Trump Administration’s so-called “Muslim Ban” illicit and, as a
consequence, vacating the nationwide injunction issued below); Trump v. Int’l Refugee
Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017) (per curiam) (declining federal government’s
request to stay preliminary nationwide injunctions extending to “respondents and those
similarly situated”); Texas v. United States, 136 S. Ct. 2271, 2272 (2016) (Mem.) (affirming
nationwide injunction blocking the Obama-era Deferred Action for Parents of Americans
(DAPA) program with an equally divided Court); Monsanto Co. v. Geertoson Seed Farms, 561
U.S. 139, 166 (2010) (Alito, J.) (holding that lower court’s nationwide injunction enjoining the
Department of Agriculture’s decision to deregulate the Roundup Ready Alfalfa plant should be
vacated because the district court abused its discretion in enjoining the agency’s partial
deregulation, not because the remedy itself was categorically infirm); Summers v. Earth Inst.,
555 U.S. 488, 500–01 (2009) (Scalia, J.); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for Women, Inc., 547 U.S. 9,
16 (2006) (Breyer, J.) (holding in context of alleged national conspiracy to shut down abortion
clinics nationwide that threatening or committing physical violence unrelated to robbery or
extortion which obstructs, delays, or affects commerce falls outside the scope of the Hobbs Act;
reversing on liability and, as a result, overturning nationwide injunction restricting protest
activities of defendants and those acting in concert with them); Scheidler v. Nat’l Org. for
Women, Inc., 537 U.S. 393, 411 (2003) (Rehnquist, C.J.) (holding that interference with
operation of abortion clinics was not extortion, as would be necessary to support a RICO
violation, reversing on merits and vacating nationwide injunction restricting protest activities
of defendants and those acting in concert with them); Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation
Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 319 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.) (explaining that nationwide preliminary
injunction of federal law imposing limit on attorneys’ fees in Department of Veterans Affairs
proceedings warranted expedited review by the Court given the remedy’s breadth), Walters,
473 U.S. at 336 (O’Connor, J., concurring) (explaining expedited review “is appropriate in the
rare case such as this where a district court has issued a nationwide injunction that in practical
effect invalidates a federal law”); Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., 468 U.S.
841, 859 (1984) (Burger, J.) (holding statute denying federal financial aid to male students who
fail to register for draft constitutional, reversing on the merits and vacating nationwide
injunction of federal statute); Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 123, 132 (1940)
(reversing lower courts’ nationwide injunction on finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, but
stopping short of deeming the scope of the remedy per se problematic). See generally Lujan v.
Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990) (Scalia, J.) (holding that national wildlife group’s
challenge of “land withdrawal review program” by the Bureau of Land Management unviable
for a variety of reasons, despite trial and intermediate appellate court concluding claims were
sufficiently substantial to warrant entry of a nationwide injunction).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/7

6

2021]

THE CHANCELLORS ARE ALRIGHT

865

The exchange arose amidst a series of extraordinary stays requested by the Trump
administration. At issue was the administration’s new public charge rule, a test that
seeks to determine whether an immigrant applying to enter the United States, extend
their visa, or convert their temporary immigration status into a green card is likely to
end up relying on public benefits in the future.20 The rule had been enjoined on a
nationwide basis by several district courts21 and limitedly in the state of Illinois only
by another district court.22 Initially, the Court granted the Trump administration
emergency stays over all the public-charge rule nationwide injunctions in Department
of Homeland Security v. New York, leaving in place the injunction covering only
Illinois.23 Concurring with that order, Justice Gorsuch, joined by Justice Thomas,
claimed the nationwide injunction is a fundamentally new remedy, framed problems
like forum-shopping and conflicting orders as being precipitated by the fact that the
remedy is a new one, and urged that the chaos sown by nationwide injunctions might
soon make it necessary for the Court to “take up some of the underlying equitable and
constitutional questions raised by the rise of nationwide injunctions.”24 But just a
month later, the Court stayed the Illinois-only injunction in Wolf v. Cook County.
Dissenting from that order, Justice Sotomayor urged that the Court had been duped—
nationwide injunctions were not the real problem.25 Incisively, she explained how the
Trump administration had, with the Court’s help, repeatedly sought and won

20 The public charge rule is controversial. For the last 20 years, the federal government has
defined as a “public charge” as a person “primarily dependent on the government for
subsistence.” Field Guidance on Deportability and Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds,
64 Fed. Reg. 28,689, 28,689 (May 26, 1999). Under that same guidance, immigration officers
were not to consider non-cash public benefits in deciding whether noncitizens met that
definition. The new rule redefined “public charge” as an alien who receives one or more
designated public benefits for more than 12 months in the aggregate within any 36-month period
(such that, for instance, receipt of two benefits in one month counts as two months).
Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds, 84 Fed. Reg. 41,292, 41,295 (Aug. 14, 2019),
reversed by Inadmissibility on Public Charge Grounds: Implementation of Vacatur, 86 Fed.
Reg. 14,221 (Mar. 15, 2021). This redefinition would have dramatically expanded the type of
benefits that render a noncitizen inadmissible, including non-cash benefits such as Supplemental
Nutrition Assistance Program, most forms of Medicaid, and various forms of housing
assistance. Id.
21 Make the Road N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, 419 F. Supp. 3d 647, 654 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting
nationwide preliminary injunction); Make the Road N.Y. v. Cuccinelli, No. 19 Civ. 7993, 2019
WL 6498283, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2019) (denying stay pending appeal); New York v. U.S.
Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 408 F. Supp. 3d 334, 340 (S.D.N.Y. 2019) (granting nationwide
preliminary injunction); New York v. U.S. Dep’t of Homeland Sec., No. 19 Civ. 7777, 2019
WL 6498250, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Dec. 2, 2019) (denying stay pending appeal); aff’d, No. 19-3595,
2020 WL 95815, at *1 (2d Cir. Jan. 8, 2020).
22 Cook Cnty. v. McAleenan, 417 F. Supp. 3d 1008, 1014 (N.D. Ill. 2019) (granting preliminary
injunction of public charge rule solely within the boundaries of the State of Illinois).
23 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 599 (2020).
24 Id. at 601.
25 Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 682 (2020) (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
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extraordinary stays in ways that caused the very abuses of process Gorsuch had
claimed nationwide injunctions sow.26
Initially, conservatives rushed to support Gorsuch’s attack on nationwide
injunctions with some liberals joining.27 But critiques were limited from the left before
Sotomayor’s dissent.28 Once Sotomayor issued her dissent in Wolf, things escalated.
Pundits on the right questioned the sincerity of Sotomayor’s arguments and accused
her of being partisan.29 Predictably, President Trump joined the fray on Twitter,
calling for Sotomayor’s recusal on the premise that her dissent in Wolf was tantamount
to accusing the conservative justices of being “biased in favor of Trump,” which he
claimed reflected her own anti-Trump proclivities.30 While pundits on the left rushed

26 Id. at 683–84; see also District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 53
(D.D.C. 2020) (characterizing similarly that the chaos Gorsuch described “was a product not of
a nationwide injunction, which would quickly settle legal issues at play once and for all potential
plaintiffs, but of emergency appeals by the federal government seeking stays of nationwide
injunctions entered by district courts”).
27 See, e.g., Ian Millhiser, Democrats Need to Listen to Neil Gorsuch’s Surprisingly Good Idea,
VOX (Jan. 29, 2020, 8:10 AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/1/29/21094603/supreme-courtdecision-on-immigration-neil-gorsuch-democrats [https://perma.cc/MV6K-FJPW] (framing
Gorsuch’s call to end nationwide injunctions as bipartisan).
28 But see Linda Greenhouse, Opinion, The Supreme Court in the Mean Season, N.Y. TIMES
(Feb. 13, 2020), https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/13/opinion/supreme-court-immigrationtrump.html [https://perma.cc/7VDA-8SQJ] (pointing out hypocrisy of conservative justices
decrying “the rise of nationwide injunctions”—“I don’t remember such hand-wringing a few
years back when anti-immigrant states found a friendly judge in South Texas to issue a
nationwide injunction against President Barack Obama’s expansion of the DACA program to
include parents of the ‘Dreamers’. The Supreme Court let that injunction stand.”).
29 See, e.g., Carrie Campbell Severino, Ginsburg and Sotomayor Are the Most Political Jurists,
NAT’L REV. (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.nationalreview.com/bench-memos/ginsburg-andsotomayor-are-the-most-political-justices/
[https://perma.cc/BQ9D-86XU]
(decrying
Sotomayor’s Wolf dissent as creating “a national spectacle” and claiming Sotomayor’s critique
evidences she and those like her are “ideologues willing to put their thumbs on the scale for
liberal causes”).
30 Donald Trump (@realDonaldTrump), TWITTER (Feb. 24, 2020, 11:09 PM),
https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/1232155591537254400?s=20
[https://web.archive.org/web/20200225195212/https://twitter.com/realDonaldTrump/status/12
32155591537254400?s=20] (quoting conservative commentator Laura Ingraham’s claim that
Justice Sotomayor’s dissent in Wolf is tantamount to “accus[ing] appointed Justices of being
biased in favor of Trump” and reflecting that “[t]his is a terrible thing to say. Trying to ‘shame’
some into voting her way? She never criticized Justice Ginsburg when she called me a ‘faker’.
Both should recuse themselves.”); Bobby Lewis, Fox & Friends Rewrites History to Defend
Trump’s Attack on the Supreme Court, MEDIA MATTERS (Mar. 5, 2020, 11:02 AM),
https://www.mediamatters.org/supreme-court/fox-friends-rewrites-history-defend-trumpsattack-supreme-court [https://perma.cc/6WSV-ME7J] (arguing that hosts of “Fox and Friends”
“falsely suggested that an earlier attack from President Donald Trump on Justices Sonia
Sotomayor and Ruth Bader Ginsburg was justified” in part based on accusation that
Sotomayor’s dissent in Wolf amounted to “political, biased remarks about [Trump]”); see also
Robert Barnes & Ashley Parker, Trump Dials up His Unusual Battle with the Judiciary, WASH.
POST (Feb 25, 2020, 7:08 PM), https://www.washingtonpost.com/politics/courts_law/trump-
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to label the conservative response as yet another product of Trumpism, few deigned
to substantively speak to the propriety of nationwide injunctions.31 While some did try
to make sense of these attacks,32 few appreciated the stakes for the Court, our modern
day chancellors, and federal equity.
This Article endeavors to reclaim the nationwide injunction as a valid exercise of
federal equity. I posit that federal equity is quite expansive—in exceptional cases, it
extends as far as necessary to provide a remedy where there is no adequate one at law.
These clear, simple limits were set by Article III and the Judiciary Act of 1789 and are
evidenced by writings of the Framers and have been readily recognized by the
Supreme Court, albeit with some equivocation, from the earliest days of the Republic
to present.
Even though federal equity jurisdiction is quite expansive, there are important
limits on its exercise. Courts sitting in equity are empowered to abstain from
exercising jurisdiction granted to them and, I contend, in some cases when faced with
a request for a nationwide injunction abstention is absolutely necessary. In fact, I
venture that many of the most pressing problems raised by nationwide injunctions can
be remedied if a new kind of abstention is recognized by the Supreme Court.
My proposal envisions a prudential, discretionary kind of abstention, akin to
Colorado River33 abstention, that can be invoked by a federal trial judge when a party
moves for a nationwide injunction. The factors are calibrated to deter abusive litigation
dials-up-his-unusual-battle-with-the-judiciary/2020/02/25/fd930eb4-5803-11ea-9000f3cffee23036_story.html [https://perma.cc/KUB3-KTHB] (reporting on Trump’s tweet calling
for Sotomayor to recuse herself in cases involving the Administration); Adam Liptak, In Case
on Wealth Test for Green Cards, a Scathing Sotomayor Dissent, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 21, 2020),
https://www.nytimes.com/2020/02/21/us/wealth-test-supreme-court-sotomayor.html
[https://perma.cc/EB6D-JQ6V] (describing Sotomayor’s dissent as “scathing” rebuke of Trump
Administration).
31 See, e.g., Garrett Epps, Trump Is at War With the Whole Idea of an Independent Judiciary,
THE ATLANTIC (Mar. 4, 2020), https://www.theatlantic.com/ideas/archive/2020/03/trumpindependent-judiciary/607375/ [https://perma.cc/3Q4B-TXXZ] (contextualizing Trump’s
attack on Sotomayor as illustrative of an overarching “theme,” explaining that “[w]hen Trump
or his friends are concerned with a case, the president wants to choose, or intimidate, both judge
and jury; participants in the nominally independent judicial process must now fear not only his
criticism but threats or even violence from his supporters”); Aaron Rupar, Trump’s Demand for
Ginsburg and Sotomayor to Recuse Themselves, Briefly Explained, VOX (Feb. 25, 2020, 11:45
AM), https://www.vox.com/2020/2/25/21152567/trump-sotomayor-ginsburg-supreme-courtindian-news-conference [https://perma.cc/8CSH-2BQQ] (“Trump’s attacks on Supreme Court
justices he perceives as being insufficiently loyal to him point to how, following his
impeachment acquittal, he’s feeling increasingly emboldened to attack any and all checks on
his power. They also illustrate his conviction that anybody who has said a critical word about
him, even indirectly, is disqualified from involvement in cases pertaining to his interests.”).
32 Daily News Editorial Board, Supreme Hypocrisy: Trump’s Selective Umbrage High Court
Justices, N.Y. DAILY NEWS (Feb. 26, 2020), https://www.nydailynews.com/opinion/ny-editscotus-20200226-ed6m7hzc2bgdjif4n74kviq7za-story.html
[https://perma.cc/6EC3-V3R9]
(arguing Trump’s comments are hypocritical in light of his valorization of the late Justice
Antonin Scalia who openly attacked the Obama Administration’s DACA policy in public fora
but declined to recuse himself from immigration cases).
33 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 814–17 (1976).
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tactics, prevent untoward interference with non-party rights and forum-shopping, and
should promote horizontal comity between the district courts as well as percolation of
issues. District Courts would, under this proposal, be empowered to dispose of these
suits in some instances and in others simply to decline to consider the relief sought.
This Article has three parts. Part II presents the terrain of the nationwide injunction
debate. It recounts the lost history of nationwide injunctions which reveals they are
not a new remedy, unpacks how and why the Trump administration embraced and
made the novelty critique a driving feature of its litigation strategy and public
messaging against the remedy, and concludes by arguing that the problems we
encounter with nationwide injunctions are not necessarily unique to the remedy let
alone caused by its supposed novelty.
Part III explores the metes and bounds of Article III’s equity. It posits that federal
equity is quite expansive, extending as far as necessary to give justice to the parties.
Though, in some respects, federal equity is informed by tradition, a long line of
Supreme Court decisions reflects that Article III’s equity is dynamic and, most
certainly, its metes and bounds are not delimited by those of the historic English
Chancellor. It ultimately concludes that nationwide injunctions are constitutional.
Part IV presents the nationwide injunction abstention proposal. It suggests that one
means of inoculating against abuses of nationwide injunctions is for courts to embrace
their abstention power. When sitting in equity, federal courts are well within their
Article III powers to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over certain nationwide
injunction cases. This Part goes on to suggest factors and balancing considerations. It
closes by exploring the benefits of an abstention approach to nationwide injunction
suits and explores likely objections to the proposal.
One contribution of this Article is its contextualization of the Trump
administration’s crusade against nationwide injunctions as being part of its larger
campaign to deflate the judiciary’s capacity to meaningfully check the executive.
While some commentators are concerned that more nationwide injunctions are being
issued today than in the past,34 this is not in and of itself evidence of judicial
overreach.35 Rather, it might simply reflect that the judiciary is actively checking
executive overreach,36 just as the Framers intended. Reframed thusly, we can see that
claims that federal courts lack the authority to enjoin executive overreach even where
proven as a “call for the federal courts to abdicate [the] judicial check on the executive

34 See discussion infra Section II.B.
35 But see Tessa Berenson, Inside the Trump Administration’s Fight to End Nationwide
Injunctions, TIME (Nov. 4, 2019, 3:12 PM), https://time.com/5717541/nationwide-injunctionstrump-administration/ [https://perma.cc/BQ6P-ZCUU] (characterizing the frequency critique as
confusing “cause and effect”).
36 Judge Rovner of the Seventh Circuit suggested as much in his panel opinion in City of
Chicago v. Barr, there dryly observing that while many scholars were concerned by “the
perceived increase in the utilization of universal injunctions in the past few decades,” that
perhaps “another forum” could assess “whether any such increase signals an expanding judicial
overreach or an increasing executive autocracy.” City of Chicago v. Barr, 957 F.3d 772, 803
(7th Cir. 2020).
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branch.”37 This Article goes on to argue that while power grabs are not totally
unexpected, the prospect of the judiciary acquiescing to the executive’s calls to
abdicate its check endangers the maintenance of our constitutional order.
Additionally, this Article also makes an important contribution to literature
speaking to the constitutional limits of federal equity. Federal equity jurisdiction and
powers are set by Article III.38 However, the exact limits are not well understood.
Supreme Court cases explaining the metes and bounds of federal equity are all over
the map. Some appear to say that federal equity is concomitant with that of the English
Chancellor at the birth of the Republic. Others seem to disavow that limit. This Article
reconciles these decisions by explaining that federal courts invoke the English
Chancellor not because he sets historic limits on our equity but rather because he
symbolically manifests equity’s aspirational aims. This ahistoric chancellor embodies
equity’s overarching commitments to justice and fairness. He also represents a
promise by our modern-day chancellors that their conscience is guided by a measure
of stability and capacity for change that are characteristic of equity’s long tradition.
Another key contribution of this Article is its suggestion that federal courts use
their inherent power to abstain from exercising jurisdiction over equitable matters as
a means to inoculate against potential abuses sowed by nationwide injunctions.39
There are several benefits to deploying abstention to the nationwide injunction
problem. One key advantage of this approach, as opposed to other proposed
solutions,40 is that abstention helps shore up the institutional legitimacy problems
imprudently granted nationwide injunctions lay bare.
II. THE TERRAIN
This Part sketches out the nationwide injunction debate. It begins by elevating the
lost history of nationwide injunctions in courts and public discourse, revealing that the
remedy is not novel. From there, it unpacks how and why the Trump administration
has embraced the novelty critique and made it a driving feature of its litigation strategy
and public messaging against the remedy. It concludes by arguing that the problems
we encounter with nationwide injunctions are not necessarily unique to the remedy let
alone caused by its supposed novelty.

37 Benjamin Spencer, First, We’ll Neuter the All the Judges, THE HILL (Feb. 14, 2020, 2:00
PM),
https://thehill.com/opinion/judiciary/482788-first-well-neuter-all-the-judges
[https://perma.cc/U9BU-QJNJ].
38 Article III vests the Supreme Court with the full judicial power in cases arising under both
law and equity. See U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1 (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases,
in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States . . . .”). It also
confers Congress with the sole power to create inferior courts and set their jurisdiction by
statute. See id. § 1 (“The judicial Power of the United States shall be vested in one supreme
Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish.”).
39 See discussion infra Section IV.A.
40 See infra Section IV.E (discussing why other proposed solutions are a poor fit).
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A. Nationwide Injunctions Are Not Novel
In recent years, a pernicious myth about nationwide injunctions has taken on a life
of itself—that the remedy is novel, and that its novelty evidences its impropriety if not
its outright unconstitutionality.
The Trump administration not only embraced the novelty critique but made it a
driving feature of its litigation strategy and public messaging against nationwide
injunctions. For instance, Department of Justice guidance issued in 2018 directed
attorneys to oppose nationwide injunctions in virtually every case justifies the move
on the theory that there are no known examples of nationwide injunctions issued in
the United States prior to 1963.41 The remedy’s novelty, the guidance claims,
evidences that nationwide injunctions are an “extreme remedy.”42 It goes on to suggest
that federal judges of the past must not have issued nationwide injunctions because
they understood the remedy to be beyond the judicial power.43 The novelty critique
also featured prominently in then-Attorney General Jeff Sessions’s remarks publicly
announcing the guidance’s issuance:
In the first 175 years of this Republic, not a single judge issued one of those orders.
It’s not as though there weren’t legal controversies before 1963. There were many.
But nobody issued a nationwide injunction[.] We’re going to fight them all the
way to the Supreme Court. I am confident that the law is on our side. History is on
our side.44
Sessions hammered the nationwide injunction’s novelty again in remarks to the
Heritage Foundation a month later, then insisting that “[s]cholars have not found a
single example of any judge issuing this type of extreme remedy before the 1960s.”45
In the months that followed, the Trump administration and its supporters’ messaging
sharpened, increasingly insisting that nationwide injunctions are a recent invention
and that the remedy’s novelty evidences its unconstitutionality.46

41 Memorandum from Jeff Sessions, U.S. Att’y Gen., to Heads of Civil Litigating Components,
U.S.
Att’ys
3
(Sept.
13,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/pressrelease/file/1093881/download [https://perma.cc/J9VQ-FZH8].
42 Id. at 4.
43 Id. at 3 (“They were unknown in the English courts of equity and so were not part of the
jurisdictional grant made by the Judiciary Act.”).
44 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen. Sessions Delivers Remarks Announcing New
Memo
on
Nationwide
Injunctions
(Sept.
13,
2018),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-announcingnew-memo-nationwide-injunctions [https://perma.cc/ZNP3-WKXY].
45 Jeff Sessions, U.S. Dep’t of Justice, Att’y Gen. Sessions Delivers Remarks at the Heritage
Foundation’s
Legal
Strategy
Forum
(Oct.
26,
2017),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/attorney-general-sessions-delivers-remarks-heritagefoundation-s-legal-strategy-forum [https://perma.cc/7PAA-H32W].
46 See discussion and notes infra Section II.B.
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The novelty critique is increasingly popular with some ideologically conservative
federal judges. For instance, in his concurrence to Trump v. Hawaii, Justice Thomas
characterizes nationwide injunctions as being “legally and historically dubious.”47 To
Thomas’s eye, nationwide injunctions break with the historic practice and
understanding of federal judges that the “judicial power” is “fundamentally the power
to render judgments in individual cases.”48 The novelty critique is also featured in
Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Department of Homeland Security v. New York.
There, Gorsuch lambasts the remedy as having “little basis in traditional equitable
practice,” “an innovation we should [not] rush to embrace,” a stranger to the
“traditional system,” and a “a sign of our impatient times.”49 The cure, Gorsuch urges,
is a return to the past—“good judicial decisions are usually tempered by older
virtues.”50
But nationwide injunctions are not exactly novel.
There are plenty of precursors to the nationwide injunction. Equity courts have
historically granted broad injunctions protecting the rights of non-parties. Bills of
peace were used to resolve claims where many individuals shared a common interest.51
Ordinary bills for injunctions also frequently protected individuals with a common
interest.52 Equity courts have also historically granted broad injunctions to protect the
rights of groups of individuals.53 Legal historians point out that some of these
injunctions protected upwards of hundreds of thousands of nonparties.54
The nationwide injunction as we know it today is not even particularly new. While
it is difficult to precisely identify when the nationwide injunction came on the scene,55
it has been part of federal equity practice for more than a century. Mila Sohoni’s Lost
History of the “Universal” Injunction points to nationwide injunctions issued by the
Supreme Court in the 1910s and 1920s56 as well as a slew of other sweeping

47 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2429 (2018).
48 Id. at 2427.
49 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Mem.).
50 Id.
51 Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and Appellee the City of
Chicago at 8–12, City of Chicago v. Whitaker, sub nom. City of Chicago v. Barr, 957 F.3d 772
(7th Cir. 2020) (No. 18-2885), 2018 WL 6173238, at *8–12.
52 Id. at 12–15.
53 Id. at 15–18.
54 Id. at 15.
55 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 943–44 (explaining evidence points to the Supreme Court issuing
nationwide type injunctions as early as 1913, but that it is possible if not probable that the
remedy had been used by the Court or lower courts earlier than that).
56 For instance, in the run-up to its decision in Lewis Publishing Co. v. Morgan, 229 U.S. 228
(1913), the Supreme Court issued an order in 1916 that, pending its disposition of the case,
barred a federal law from being applied not just to the plaintiffs, but to anyone. See Sohoni,
supra note 17, at 944–46 (providing background and discussing significance of the order). The
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injunctions issued by lower courts that directly and intentionally benefitted
nonparties.57
One consequence of mistakenly thinking of nationwide injunctions as new is that
we miss the rich history of how federal courts have squared the remedy with their
judicial power, made sense of the remedy’s breadth, and how the public has responded.
Until recently, nationwide injunctions do not seem to have raised difficult
questions about the metes and bounds judicial power. For a long time, federal courts
simply assumed nationwide injunctions to be within the metes and bounds of federal
equity. For instance, high-profile Supreme Court cases on lightning rod issues of the
day, like a challenge to compulsory male selective service registration,58 dryly
reference the fact that a nationwide injunction was issued and go on to address the
merits of the underlying decision. When pressed to justify the remedy, federal courts
reasoned that they have inherent judicial authority to issue nationwide injunctions
even in the absence of a specific authorizing statute.59 An early representative example
is the 1939 nationwide injunction issued in Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins.60 There, the
D.C. Circuit reasoned that federal courts have the power to enjoin a federal official
and agency from engaging in certain purchasing activities with respect to iron and
steel industries and ultimately deemed it of no moment that there was no legislation
expressly authorizing such an injunction.61

Court issued a similar order enjoining enforcement of a federal law beyond the plaintiffs in
1921, pending its final disposition in Hill v. Wallace, 259 U.S. 44 (1922), a challenge to the
Future Trading Act. See Sohoni, supra note 17, at 946–52 (providing background and discussing
significance of the order).
Additionally, in 1935 the Supreme Court issued a discretionary stay order in Landis v. North
American Co., 299 U.S. 248 (1936), halting all but one suit challenging the constitutionality of
the Public Utility Holding Company Act of 1935. Id. at 250–51. The Landis discretionary stay
operated as a kind of self-imposed nationwide injunction, approved in exchange for the
Securities and Exchange Commission, which feared a multiplicity of suits, promising to stay
enforcement of the challenged federal law as to anyone during the pendency of the suit.
57 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 959–73.
58 Selective Serv. Sys. v. Minn. Pub. Int. Rsch. Grp., 468 U.S. 841, 846 (1984) (Burger, C.J.)
(noting district court’s issuance of nationwide injunction).
59 See Polly J. Price, Full Faith and Credit and the Equity Conflict, 84 VA. L. REV. 747, 789 &
n.188 (2008) (“Federal courts generally relief upon the All Writs Act, 28 U.S.C. § 1651 (1994),
for the authority to enter injunctions not otherwise expressly authorized by statute.”); 28 U.S.C.
§ 1651(a) (“The Supreme Court and all courts established by Act of Congress may issue all
writs necessary or appropriate in aid of their respective jurisdictions and agreeable to the usages
and principles of law.”).
60 Lukens Steel Co. v. Perkins, 107 F.2d 627, 629 (D.C. Cir. 1939).
61 Id. at 638. Although the Supreme Court later reversed the D.C. Circuit, the reversal hinged
on its finding that the plaintiffs lacked standing, it did not deem the scope of the injunction per
se problematic. Perkins v. Lukens Steel Co., 310 U.S. 113, 125 (1940) (“[N]o legal rights of
respondents were shown to have been invaded or threatened in the complaint upon which the
injunction of the Court of Appeals was based.”); see also Sohoni, supra note 17, at 926
(characterizing Perkins as leaving “intact the propriety of injunctions reaching beyond plaintiffs
with standing”). But see Samuel Bray, A Response to The Lost History of the “Universal”
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The Supreme Court has had several opportunities to reject the nationwide
injunction and declined to do so. As recently as 2017, the Court declined the federal
government’s request in Trump v. International Refugee Assistance Project62 to stay
preliminary injunctions extending to “respondents and those similarly situated.”63 The
Fourth Circuit has since construed this as “affirm[ing] the equitable power of district
courts, in appropriate cases, to issue nationwide injunctions.”64
Where the Supreme Court has disturbed nationwide injunctions, it has identified
infirmities in the suits that obviate the remedy. For example, the Court reversed the
nationwide injunction issued in Lukens, but its decision hinged on finding the plaintiffs
lacked standing rather than finding the remedy is categorically infirm.65 Similarly, in
Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms,66 a challenge to a nationwide injunction
enjoining the Department of Agriculture’s decision to deregulate the Roundup Ready
Alfalfa plant, the Court explains that the remedy should be vacated because the district
court abused its discretion in enjoining the agency’s partial deregulation, not because
the remedy was categorically infirm.67 And in Summers v. Earth Island Institute,68 a
challenge to a nationwide injunction enjoining the Forest Service’s approval of
salvage sales of timber on fire damaged federal lands, the Court reasoned that the
remedy should be vacated because the plaintiffs failed to establish standing, mooting
the question as to whether in that specific case “a nationwide injunction would be
appropriate.”69
This is not to say that the courts have not been weary of breadth generally and the
nationwide injunction’s breadth specifically.
The Supreme Court has urged that remedies be no broader than necessary.
However, the Court has not ever taught that a remedy’s breadth renders it categorically

Injunction,
YALE
J.
REGUL.:
NOTICE
&
COMMENT
(Oct.
6,
2019),
https://www.yalejreg.com/nc/a-response-to-the-lost-history-of-the-universal-injunction-bysamuel-bray/ [https://perma.cc/4GED-PJDK] (arguing otherwise).
62 Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2088–89 (2017) (per curiam).
63 Id. at 2087.
64 Roe v. Dep’t of Def., 947 F.3d 207, 232 (4th Cir. 2020); see also City of Chicago v. Sessions,
888 F.3d 272, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2018), reh’g en banc granted in part, opinion vacated in part,
No. 17-2991, 2018 WL 4268817 (7th Cir. June 4, 2017) (construing Int’l Refugee Assistance
Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, as signaling validity of nationwide injunctions).
65 Perkins, 310 U.S. at 125 (“[N]o legal rights of respondents were shown to have been invaded
or threatened in the complaint upon which the injunction of the Court of Appeals was based.”);
see also Sohoni, supra note 17, at 926 (characterizing Perkins as leaving “intact the propriety
of injunctions reaching beyond plaintiffs with standing”). But see Bray, supra note 61 (arguing
otherwise).
66 Monsanto Co. v. Geertson Seed Farms, 561 U.S. 139, 144 (2010) (Alito, J.).
67 Id. at 165 (“[T]he impropriety of the District Court’s broad injunction against planting flows
from the impropriety of its injunction against partial deregulation.”).
68 Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488, 490 (2009) (Scalia, J.).
69 Id. at 500–01.
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infirm. For instance, in Califano v. Yamasaki, the Court teaches that when crafting
remedies courts must take heed of equity’s “rule that injunctive relief should be no
more burdensome to the defendant than necessary to provide complete relief to the
plaintiffs.”70 It goes on to explain, that in the context of a nationwide class action, the
size of the class of plaintiffs does not make a remedy impossible.71
As to nationwide injunctions specifically, the Supreme Court has long suggested
that the remedy’s breadth may warrant special consideration on review. For instance,
in Walters v. National Ass’n of Radiation Survivors,72 Justice Rehnquist, writing for
the majority, explains that a nationwide preliminary injunction enjoining a federal law
that imposed a limit on attorneys’ fees in Department of Veterans Affairs proceedings
warranted immediate review by the Supreme Court under a since repealed procedural
mechanism because such a broad injunction, if left in place, frustrates the will of
Congress.73 Rehnquist’s point does not seem to be that nationwide injunctions are
ultra vires, but rather, that their breadth can sometimes justify expedited review given
how much more disruptive they are than more narrow injunctions. Justice O’Connor’s
concurrence in Walters echoes that sentiment, explaining that expedited review “is
appropriate in the rare case such as this where a district court has issued a nationwide
injunction that in practical effect invalidates a federal law.”74 Similarly, in Lujan v.
National Wildlife Federation,75 Justice Blackman, writing “in dissent but apparently
expressing the view of all nine justices,”76 suggests that the fact that the district court
issued a nationwide preliminary injunction enjoining a federal agency’s efforts to sell
public lands, warranted special consideration by the Court. Blackmun explains that
the fact that the district court and circuit court both had concluded that the underlying
claims were “sufficiently substantial to warrant the entry of a nationwide injunction”
should heavily weigh against deeming the plaintiffs insufficiently aggrieved to
challenge the land sale in the first instance.77
While some critics urge that the lower federal courts have simply failed to
appreciate the remedy’s breadth, many decisions reflect just the opposite. Public law
opinions underscore that nationwide injunctions are only warranted in truly

70 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
71 Id. (“Nor is a nationwide class inconsistent with principles of equity jurisprudence, since the
scope of relief is dictated by the extent of the violation established, not by the geographical
extent of the plaintiff class. If a class action is otherwise proper, and if jurisdiction lies over the
claims of the members of the class, the fact that the class is nationwide in scope does not
necessarily mean that the relief afforded the plaintiffs will be more burdensome than necessary
to redress the complaining parties.”).
72 Walters v. Nat’l Ass’n of Radiation Survivors, 473 U.S. 305, 307 (1985) (Rehnquist, J.).
73 Id. at 319.
74 Id. at 336 (O’Connor, J., concurring).
75 Lujan v. Nat’l Wildlife Fed’n, 497 U.S. 871 (1990).
76 Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998).
77 Lujan, 497 U.S. at 913.
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extraordinary circumstances.78 Where nationwide injunctions are issued pursuant to
inherent judicial authority, courts appear to take considerable effort to tailor the
remedy in light of traditional equitable principles.79 Some otherwise justify nationwide
injunctions where regulations are challenged on the theory that courts are both
expressly authorized to act80 and reason that it is otherwise necessary to broadly enjoin
unlawful agency actions in total.81 Others reason that nationwide scope is reasonable
where there is a nationwide class, believing anything short of a nationwide injunction
would be insufficient to protect the class.82 Private law decisions similarly reflect
careful consideration of nationwide injunction’s breadth. It should be noted that in the
vast majority of private law cases where nationwide injunctions are issued, the remedy
is expressly authorized by statute, which raises fewer concerns about judicial
overreach.83 And yet, many courts approach even those cases with caution. As one
example, lower courts routinely decline to issue nationwide injunctions in suits

78 See, e.g., City of Chicago v. Barr, 961 F.3d 882, 938 (7th Cir. 2020) (Manion, J., concurring)
(“An injunction is a drastic and extraordinary remedy, outdone only by an injunction issued on
a national scale. This type of relief should be issued only when absolutely necessary and the
court rightly recognizes it is far from necessary here.”).
79 See, e.g., Bregsal v. Brock, 843 F.2d 1163, 1170–71 (9th Cir. 1987) (“[A]n injunction is not
necessarily made over-broad by extending benefit or protection to persons other than prevailing
parties in the lawsuit—even if it is not a class action—if such breadth is necessary to give
prevailing parties the relief to which they are entitled.”).
80 This principle flows, in part, from the text of section 706 of the Administrative Procedures
Act. 5 U.S.C. § 706 (reviewing courts “shall” “set aside” unlawful agency actions). See, e.g., E.
Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Trump, 950 F.3d 1242, 1283 (9th Cir. 2020) (“Singular equitable
relief is commonplace in APA cases, and is often necessary to provide the plaintiffs with
complete redress.”); Pennsylvania v. President of the U.S., 930 F.3d 543, 575 (3d Cir. 2019)
(“[C]ourts invalidate—without qualification—unlawful administrative rules as a matter of
course, leaving their predecessors in place until the agencies can take further action.”); Earth
Island Inst. v. Ruthenbeck, 490 F.3d 687, 699 (9th Cir. 2007) (observing “the text of the” APA’s
section 706 “compel[s]” nationwide injunctions of invalid rules), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub
nom. Summers v. Earth Island Inst., 555 U.S. 488 (2009); Nat’l Mining Ass’n v. U.S. Army
Corps of Eng’rs, 145 F.3d 1399, 1409 (D.C. Cir. 1998) (“When a reviewing court determines
that agency regulations are unlawful, the ordinary result is that the rules are vacated—not that
their application to the individual petitioners is proscribed.”).
81 See, e.g., Make the Rd. N.Y. v. McAleenan., 405 F. Supp. 3d 1, 72 (D.D.C. 2019) (entering
national injunction against agency rule where plaintiff proved rule unlawfully promulgated on
the logic that merely halting the rule’s application to the plaintiff may lessen the real-world
impact of the unlawful rule as to the plaintiff but does not fully redress “the violation
established”—the promulgation of an unlawful rule); see also Doe v. Rumsfeld, 341 F. Supp.
2d 1, 18–19 (D.D.C. 2004) (entering a permanent injunction of the Department of Defense’s
“involuntary anthrax inoculation program” as to “all persons” not just the plaintiffs).
82 See, e.g., Doe #1 v. Trump, 957 F.3d 1050, 1069 (9th Cir. 2020) (“[A] provisionally certified
nationwide class is sufficient justification for a nationwide injunction.”).
83 See, e.g., Price, supra note 59 at 789–90 (pointing out that when federal courts exercising
federal question jurisdiction in certain areas no comity concerns; also points out that some
federal IP statutes expressly authorize nationwide injunctions as forms of relief).
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brought under state law where the remedy would have applied the law of one state
beyond its borders.84
Given the foregoing, it is perhaps unsurprising that public reception to the
nationwide injunction was relatively neutral up through the 2010s. Legal
commentators and popular press dryly reported on nationwide injunctions against the
federal government and even natural persons85 for decades expressing no concern
about the remedy’s constitutionality. For instance, though somewhat unorthodox at
the time, the Landis order was not deemed problematic by legal commentators.86
Popular press in the 1970s through the early 2000s took a similar approach—
recognizing the breath of the remedy is significant, but not questioning its
constitutionality.87

84 In these decisions, courts head the rule that one state cannot legislate for others or project its
laws across state lines so as to preclude the other from prescribing for itself the legal
consequences of acts within it. Pac. Emps. Ins. v. Indus. Accident Comm’n, 306 U.S. 493, 504–
05 (1939); Katherine Florey, State Courts, State Territory, State Power: Reflections on the
Extraterritoriality Principle in Choice of Law and Legislation, 84 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1057,
1104–08 (2009); see, e.g., Nissan Motor Co. v. Nissan Comput. Corp., 378 F.3d 1002, 1015
(9th Cir. 2004) (“While California courts have repeatedly held that they have authority to issue
injunctions which have effect beyond the borders of California, this remains an open question
in this circuit. As we have no ruling before us, we leave the constitutionality of a nationwide
injunction based on state law for another day and remand to the district court to consider, if
necessary, whether it would grant injunctive relief, or later its scope, if the dilution were based
solely on California law.”); Hyatt Corp. v. Hyatt Legal Servs., 610 F. Supp. 381, 385 (N.D. Ill.
1985) (concluding that nationwide injunction of advertising practices would place an “excessive
burden on commerce in light of the interest sought to be protected”).
85 See, e.g., Jane Fritsch, Cover Story: The Man Who Sued Too Much Acting as His Own
Lawyer, Anthony R. Martin-Trigona Flooded Several Courts with Hundreds of Lawsuits,
Motions and Appeals. Frustrated Judges Struck Back by Taking an Extraordinary Action: They
Imposed a Nationwide Curb on His Right to Sue, NEWSDAY, Feb. 1, 1987, 1987 WLNR 141540
(“Before the session ended close to 7 p.m., Cabranes had dismissed nearly all of MartinTrigona's federal cases in Connecticut and entered a nationwide injunction barring MartinTrigona from ever again suing any of the people involved in the Connecticut litigation or, for
that matter, anyone at all in any state or federal court without first getting court permission.
Cabranes instructed a Justice Department lawyer to inform court clerks across the country of
the injunction. . . . MARTIN-TRIGONA is believed to be the first person whose actions have
provoked a nationwide injunction.”).
86 See, e.g., Note, The Discretionary Stay as a Strategic Device in Constitutional Litigation, 46
YALE L.J. 897, 902 (1937) (“But the fact that the stay in the present case may be unorthodox as
compared with stays regarded as proper in private law cases, does not seem to be an urgent
objection in the perspective of constitutional politics.”).
87 See, e.g., Keith B. Richburg, Title I in Chaos After Ruling on Religious-School Funding,
WASH. POST, Aug. 14, 1985, at A21,1985 WLNR 1496412 (“A federal judge in Missouri
ordered the Education Department last week to stop using public money to provide remedial
instruction to children in religious schools, in light of the Supreme Court's decision last month
that such programs violate the constitutional doctrine of separation of church and state. In
Kentucky, another group of plaintiffs is citing the Supreme Court decision and asking a federal
judge there to impose a nationwide injunction, barring the use of Title I money in religious
schools. With schoolhouse doors set to open in a few weeks, these court cases and others have
thrown the Title I program, under which federal money is provided to local school districts for
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The public narrative about nationwide injunctions shifted dramatically at the tail
end of the Obama administration and public outcry reached a fever pitch under the
Trump administration.
B. The Novelty Critique
Since the early 2010s, there has been a considerable uptick in public speeches,
congressional testimony, and op-eds urging that we do away with nationwide
injunctions.88 By the late aughts, much of the public messaging criticizing nationwide
injunctions coalesced around the talking point that the remedy is new, cooked up by
activist federal judges to interfere with the executive’s policy agenda.89

disadvantaged students, into chaos.”); David Phelps, Attorneys General Seek More Power in
Consumer-Fraud Cases, MINNEAPOLIS STAR & TRIB., July 27, 1987, at M4, 1987 WLNR
1360097 (“Members of the National Association of Attorneys General last week recommended
that states be granted the authority to take consumer-protection cases into federal court, where
they could seek nationwide injunctions against fraudulent practices. During a congressional
hearing, a panel of give attorneys general testified that federal efforts were ineffective in
protecting consumers from deceptive marketing practices, retail fraud and defective products.”;
Minn. Att’y Gen. Hubert Humphrey III: “As individual states, we are hamstrung to solve
nationwide problems.”); U.S. Drops Enforcement of New Abortion Rules, ST. LOUIS POSTDISPATCH, Mar. 4, 1988, at 8F, 1988 WLNR 341834 (“The administration acted Thursday,
hours after a federal district judge in Boston issued a nationwide injunction permanently barring
enforcement of the restriction. A rule enforcing it was to take effect Thursday.”); Matt
O’Connor, NOW Seeks Court Curb on Protests at Clinics, CHICAGO TRIB., July 1, 1998 (§ 2),
at 8, 1998 WLNR 6481497 (“Crain also said that injunctions have been imposed in at least 14
locations around the country as a result of the law [Freedom of Access to Clinic Entrances Act],
making any nationwide injunction in this case an unneeded ‘layer of protection’. But lawyers
for NOW and abortion clinics put on evidence that violence and threats have continued to be
used by activists in anti-abortion protests in the four years since the law was enacted.”); Bob
Egelko, Forrest Service Rebuked on Logging: Public Must be Able to Comment Without Suing,
U.S. Court Says, S.F. CHRON., Aug. 11, 2006, at A2, 2006 WLNR 13886507 (construing
nationwide injunction as pro-public access to government insofar as it is rebuke of Bush
administration attempts to thwart public notice and comment on agency action).
88 See, e.g., News Release, U.S. Dep’t of Just., Assistant Attorney General Beth Williams
Delivers Remarks on Nationwide Injunctions at the Heritage Foundation (Feb. 4, 2019),
https://www.justice.gov/opa/speech/assistant-attorney-general-beth-williams-deliversremarks-nationwide-injunctions-heritage [https://perma.cc/8B5S-AGQS] (“The entry of
nationwide injunctions is a relatively rare phenomenon: nationwide injunctions did not exist
even sixty years ago. Before 1963, no court in the country had issued such a broad injunction,
and they were exceedingly rare until President Regan took office. Even after that, by Justice
Department estimates, courts issued an average of only 1.5 nationwide injunctions per year
against the Reagan, Clinton, and George W. Bush administrations, and 2.5 per year against the
Obama administration. In President Trump’s first year in office, however, judges issued a
whopping 20 nationwide injunctions—an eightfold increase. This matches the entire eight-year
total of such injunctions issued against President Obama during his two terms. We are now at
30, matching the total number of injunctions issued against the first 42 presidents.”).
89 See, e.g., GianCarlo Canapara, Time to End the Tyranny of District Court Judges’
FOUND.
(Feb.
18,
2020),
Nationwide
Injunctions,
HERITAGE
https://www.heritage.org/courts/commentary/time-end-the-tyranny-district-court-judgesnationwide-injunctions [https://perma.cc/NKW7-9ZYD] (claiming “the judiciary has grown
more powerful than America’s Founders intended and, since the 1960s, this has included issuing

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021

19

878

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[69:859

So, where did the novelty critique come from? It appears to have first been floated
by remedies scholar Samuel Bray in his 2017 article Multiple Chancellors: Reforming
the National Injunction.90 There, Bray claims that “[t]hrough the middle of the
twentieth century, there do not appear to have been any national injunctions.”91 Critics
of the remedy have seemingly just taken Bray’s account and ran with it. This is curious
because Bray’s argument has some serious problems. Among others, it is premised on
a dubious history of the nationwide injunction. Not only does Bray erroneously claim
that the remedy emerged for the first time in the 1960s—a point that Sohoni’s research
reflects is off by at least five decades—but he also fails to take into account the
existence of historically equivalent remedies that have long been considered part of
traditional equity practice. These errors are significant because Bray’s proposed
solution—that we do away with the nationwide injunction entirely—turns on the
premise that eliminating the remedy returns equity to its historic limits.92
To date, the reason why the novelty critique has been seized upon, despite its
dubious underpinnings, has been under-interrogated. I would like to suggest that the
novelty critique was deployed by the Trump administration as part of its overarching
strategy to smear the judiciary, with the end goal of deflating the judiciary’s capacity
to meaningfully check the executive. Other commentators have observed that Trump’s
aggressive attacks on the judiciary are not only unprecedented in modern times,93 but
instead appear to be calibrated to “rally a fearful public into accepting his disregard of
judicial authority.”94 I believe that the Trump administration’s escalating assaults were

universal injunctions” and going on to argue that this improperly facilitates activist judges’
interference with Executive governance); David French, The Nationwide Dysfunction of the
REV.
(June
6,
2019),
District-Court
Injunction,
NAT’L
https://www.nationalreview.com/magazine/2019/06/24/the-nationwide-dysfunction-of-thedistrict-court-injunction/ [https://perma.cc/292K-T4VG] (“[T]hese judges have started to take
for themselves a staggering amount of power.”).
90 Bray, supra note 9.
91 Id. at 437.
92 Id. at 481–82.
93 See, e.g., Peter Baker, Trump Clashes Early with Courts, Portending Years of Legal Battles,
N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 5, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/05/us/politics/donald-trumpmike-pence-travel-ban-judge.html [https://perma.cc/L3Y5-B63B] (“Trump’s serial attacks on
judges and the judiciary take us into new territory.” (quoting Jack Goldsmith, head of the Justice
Department’s Office of Legal Counsel under President George W. Bush)); Julie Hirschfeld
Davis, Supreme Court Nominee Calls Trump’s Attacks on Judiciary ‘Demoralizing,’ N.Y.
TIMES (Feb. 8, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/08/us/politics/donald-trumpimmigration-ban.html [https://perma.cc/QRE4-F7YA] (“Mr. Trump is shredding longstanding
norms of etiquette and interbranch comity.” (quoting former George W. Bush judicial appointee
Michael McConnell)).
94 Neil S. Siegel, Reciprocal Legitimation in the Federal Courts System, 70 VAND. L. REV.
1183, 1245 (2017).
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less about the specific subject-matter and more about creating public pressure to
weaken the judiciary’s legitimacy and with that, authority.95
The Trump administration’s crusade against nationwide injunctions is but one
example of how it strategically attacked the judiciary with the aim of subordinating
the courts’ authority within our constitutional scheme.96 Labeling the nationwide
injunction as novel helped the Trump administration craft a narrative of judicial
overreach. This is helpful, because it covers up the fact that we are actually witnessing
a moment of unprecedented executive overreach and herculean efforts by the judiciary
to check it.
One way novelty is used as cover is as an explanatory account of why the federal
courts issue more nationwide injunctions against the federal government today than in
the past. Trump and his surrogates claimed the uptick in nationwide injunctions
evidenced judicial overreach.97 This is sleight of hand. A more plausible explanation
is that more nationwide injunctions are issued today than in the past because the
executive branch has, for decades, been overreaching Article II’s limits.98 The

95 See, e.g., Paul Krugman, Opinion, When the Fire Comes, N.Y. TIMES (Feb. 10, 2017),
https://www.nytimes.com/2017/02/10/opinion/when-the-fire-comes.html
[https://perma.cc/GX9R-B9S8] (warning in the early days of the Administration that the court
might very well be the only institution capable of checking Trump but that he is “doing all he
can to delegitimize judicial oversight in advance,” citing as one example Trump’s attack on
Judge James Robart, who issued a stay on one of the Muslim bans, calling him a “so-called
judge”).
96 This tack is well explored in the literature. See, e.g., Christopher D. Kromphardt & Michael
F. Salamone, “Unprecedented!” Or: What Happens When the President Attacks the Federal
Judiciary on Twitter, 18 J. INFO. TECH. & POL’Y 1, 84 (2020) (presenting survey experiment
finding specific, but not diffuse, support for the proposition that public support in the Supreme
Court changes in response to Trump attacks, but that changes are conditioned on respondents'
preexisting support for democratic values). But see Michael J. Nelson & James L. Gibson, Has
Trump Trumped the Courts?, 93 N.Y.U. L. REV. ONLINE 32, 34–40 (2018) (presenting and
discussing results of nationally-representative survey of Americans reflecting that Trump’s
criticisms of the court, regardless of content, had little effect on respondent’s support for the
institution, but that there was a significant decline in support for the Court where respondents
learned of criticism by law professors that the Court’s decisions are politicized).
97 See, e.g., Katie Benner, Nationwide Injunctions Speak to Judiciary’s Growing Power, Barr
Says, N.Y. TIMES (May 21, 2019), https://www.nytimes.com/2019/05/21/us/politics/barrnationwide-injunctions.html [https://perma.cc/Z9QG-HQFG] (quoting Barr: “Rather than an
orderly pattern of litigation in which the government loses some cases and wins others, with
issues percolating their way through the appellate courts, we have an interdistrict battle fought
with all-or-nothing injunctions. . . . Nationwide injunctions undermine the democratic process,
depart from history and tradition, violate constitutional principles, and impede sound judicial
administration, all at the cost of public confidence in our institutions and particularly in our
courts as apolitical decision makers.”).
98 This trend has been well explored in a variety of areas. See, e.g., Heidi Kitrosser, National
Security and the Article II Shell Game, 26 CONST. COMMENT. 483, 487–521 (2010) (arguing that
relatively recent phenomenon of “presidential exclusivity” in the realm of national security
arose as a result of Congress ceding authority to the Executive overtime, its political appeal for
both branches, and how it operates as a shell game ultimately depriving the public of meaningful
accountability from either branch).
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Constitution vests Congress and the executive with joint power to frame and
implement policy goals. When our system functions, the political branches are
incentivized to broker policy compromises together. But our system has not been
functional for decades. Congress has been unable to enact bipartisan legislation for a
long time. This precipitous decline in congressional authority has perversely
incentivized the executive to take unilateral actions—ever more dubious executive
actions and regulations that push beyond Article II’s limits—to implement its policy
goals.99 Because these executive power grabs have disrupted the Constitution’s vision
of public policy being jointly determined by the executive with the legislature,100
stakeholders turned to the judiciary, our third branch, to try to correct course,101 just
as the Framers intended.102 Another possibility is that there are more nationwide
injunctions today because there is far more public law litigation by well-funded
nonprofits seeking the remedy. The increased aggressiveness of states’ attorneys
general is another potential factor. Many states routinely turn to nationwide injunction
suits to check, largely on partisan lines,103 the executive’s signature policies, rules,
and regulations.104 Nationwide injunctions might be more common today than they
were in the 1960s for another reason—Congress drastically limited the availability of
three-judge courts in 1976, pushing many cases of national import to single judges.105
99 See Edward G. Carmines & Matthew Fowler, The Temptation of Executive Authority: How
Increased Polarization and the Decline in Legislative Capacity Have Contributed to the
Expansion of Presidential Power, 24 IND. J. GLOB. LEGAL STUD. 369, 369–70 (2017) (arguing
increased polarization and a decline in legislative capacity have acted as reinforcing influences
that, under a divided government and parity of strength of parties at the national level, have
fueled the expansion of executive authority at the expense of a national legislature).
100 Michael J. Barber & Nolan McCarty, Causes and Consequences of Polarization, in
SOLUTIONS TO POLITICAL POLARIZATION IN AMERICA 15, 50 (Nathaniel Persily ed., 2015).
101 See Doug Rendleman, Preserving the Nationwide National Government Injunction to Stop
Illegal Executive Branch Activity, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 887, 897 (2020) (“National government
injunctions respond to a paralyzed Congress as well as the federal executive’s practice of issuing
executive orders and administrative regulations to make major unilateral policy changes that
bypass the legislative process.”).
102 See, e.g., Myers v. United States, 272 U.S. 52, 293 (1926) (Brandeis, J., dissenting) (“The
doctrine of separation of powers was adopted by the convention of 1787 not to promote
efficiency but to preclude the exercise of arbitrary power. The purpose was not to avoid friction,
but, by means of the inevitable friction incident to the distribution of the governmental powers
among three departments, to save the people from autocracy.”).
103 Margaret H. Lemos & Ernest A. Young, State Public-Law Litigation in an Age of
Polarization, 97 TEX. L. REV. 43, 46 (2018).
104 See Carolyn Shapiro, Democracy, Federalism, and the Guarantee Clause, 62 ARIZ. L. REV.
183, 225 (2020) (observing that rise of nationwide injunction litigations has dramatically shifted
power at state level, with the remedy allowing attorneys general to have “more immediate
effects on nationwide policy than can governors and state legislatures”).
105 Thanks to Maggie Gardner for suggesting that the rise and fall of three judge panels might,
in part, explain why early nationwide injunctions were fewer farer between. For much of the
twentieth century, three-judge courts were available for constitutional challenges to state laws
and administrative orders and Acts of Congress. During that period, it seems likely that three-
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Attacks premised on novelty also helped the Trump administration shift blame for
the executive’s political failures onto the judiciary. For instance, Trump and his
surrogates charged that nationwide injunctions are problematic because they
disincentivize the political branches from working out disputes amongst themselves.
Former Attorney General Barr floated this objection in a Wall Street Journal opinion
piece, complaining there that nationwide injunctions force a resolution to disputes that
would otherwise be resolved by compromises struck between the executive and
Congress.106 In Barr’s telling, the judiciary is an interloper, disrupting the natural
allocation of responsibility for policy setting vested in the political branches.107 Key
to this argument is that nationwide injunctions are new, and this is a problem that other
administrations did not have to grapple with. Once again, this is sleight of hand. The
executive bears blame for disrupting normal channels of political accountability. The
executive has repeatedly used nationwide injunction suits for political cover. Collusive
litigations are one example. The executive both outright invited suits against it and, in
legacy cases, filed against a previous administration with policy preferences
diametrically opposed to its own, capitulated to the “opposition’s” demands.
Nationwide injunctions that issued in these cases are subterfuge—they simply help the
executive make a policy call it could not otherwise make through normal political
channels.108 A less discussed but no less concerning phenomena is the executive using

judge courts adjudicated contentious issues that often take the form of nationwide injunctions
suits today. Cf Note, Judicial Limitation of Three-Judge Court Jurisdiction, 85 YALE L.J. 564
(1976) (describing the rise and fall of the three-judge court in federal practice and suggesting,
in part, that declaratory judgments issued by a single judge instead); Comment, Stone v.
Philbrook: Another Word on Three-Judge Courts and Declaratory Judgments, 124 U. PA. L.
REV. 1448 (1976) (similar).The precipitous increase in nationwide injunctions, roughly,
corresponds with Congress’s elimination of three-judge courts in all but a handful of cases. In
1976, Congress repealed 28 U.S.C. §§ 2281, 2282, which used to prescribe the composition and
procedure for three-judge courts. The replacement, 28 U.S.C. § 2284, now delineates more
narrow parameters for when a three-judge court can be convened—only where “required by Act
of Congress” or “when an action is filed challenging the constitutionality of the appointment of
congressional districts or the apportionment of any statewide legislative body.”
106 William P. Barr, Opinion, End Nationwide Injunctions, WALL ST. J. (Sept. 5, 2019),
https://www.wsj.com/articles/end-nationwide-injunctions-11567723072
[https://perma.cc/9JF6-58CJ] (arguing nationwide injunctions ruin the chance for political
compromise).
107 Id.
108 See, e.g., Edward Whelan, Don’t Defend, Don’t Appeal?, WASH. EXAM’R (Nov. 8, 2010),
https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/weekly-standard/dont-defend-dont-appeal
[https://perma.cc/242L-QDAM] (expressing concern by an ideological conservative that
Obama administration would for policy reasons decline to appeal nationwide injunction of
DOMA); Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, Why Fight It?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 21, 2010, at A21, 2010
WLNR 21028195 (observing that if the Obama administration allows DOMA nationwide
injunction to stand that it could “provide the political cover necessary for Congress to repeal
this law because it would then be doing no more than changing the law to be in compliance with
a federal court order”).
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the threat of nationwide injunctions as cover for adopting extreme and otherwise
legally specious regulations.109
Novelty also helped the Trump administration publicly justify its unprecedented
campaign of personal attacks on sitting federal judges. Trump and his surrogates
claimed that individual federal judges who dare to check the administration are acting
as arms of the party that nominated them,110 fanning the narrative that federal judges
are illegitimate political actors that should be rebuked by political means.111 Key to
this argument is that these judges are acting in ways judges did not in the past—as
political actors112—which their use of the nationwide injunction evidences.113
Novelty was also used to delegitimize judicial review of executive action. Former
Attorney General Sessions’s rhetoric in the first years of the Trump administration
well illustrates this. In a particularly caustic statement in April 2017, made just a few
weeks after Judge Derick K. Watson of the District of Hawaii issued a nationwide

109 See generally Timothy G. Duncheon, Litigation Risk as Justification for Agency Action, 95
N.Y.U. L. REV. 193, 194–234 (2020) (arguing that agencies should not be able to cite bare
litigation risk as a justification for rescinding or making a new rule under the Administrative
Procedures Act).
110 See, e.g., Craig Trainor, Nationwide Injunctions: Obstruction by Other Means, WASH.
EXAM’R (May 31, 2019), https://www.washingtonexaminer.com/opinion/op-eds/nationwideinjunctions-obstruction-by-other-means [https://perma.cc/W6VR-VHBU] (“[T]he nationwide
injunctions serve the political interests of the modern Democratic Party. The judiciary can ill
afford such a naked partisan impression because it calls into question its legitimacy as a neutral
arbiter of cases and controversies.”).
111 See, e.g., Jordan Fabian & Jacqueline Thomsen, Courts Become Turbocharged
HILL
(July
22,
2019),
Battleground
in
Trump
Era,
THE
https://thehill.com/homenews/administration/453881-courts-become-turbochargedbattleground-in-trump-era [https://perma.cc/NVH8-MRFT] (Mike Davis, former Republican
Senate and White House aide: “The more these judges weigh into these political matters . . .
they undermine the legitimacy of the court and make it more likely that the president or
Congress will make a political attack on the courts. . . . Don’t go into the political arena if you
don’t want to take political punches.”).
112 Federal judges have been accused of activism outside the context of nationwide injunctions.
More generally, accusations of activism proceed on the premise that “unelected judges have
usurped the functions of the political branches when they have used legal principles to effectuate
their own preferred policy aims.” Jane S. Schacter, Politics of “Judicial Activism,” SUP. CT.
REV. 209, 215 (2017).
113 Charlton Copeland offers a different take. He argues:
Understanding the context in which courts issue nationwide injunctions
requires understanding courts as institutions embedded in an ecosystem that
includes more than simply “rogue” judges or judicial doctrine. Courts are
political institutions with their own agendas for building capacity to resolve
societal challenges. This dynamic forces us to consider the ways that courts
exist as both competitors to and allies with other political institutions.
Charlton C. Copeland, Seeing Beyond Courts: The Political Context of the Nationwide
Injunction, 91 U. COLO. L. REV. 789, 794 (2020).
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injunction114 against the Second Muslim Ban, Sessions opined, “I really am amazed
that a judge sitting on an island in the Pacific can issue an order that stops the president
of the United States from what appears to be clearly his statutory and constitutional
power.”115 Key to this account is that the nationwide injunction is a new,
unprecedented remedy that threatens the constitutional order. This is, again, sleight of
hand. Claims that federal courts lack the authority to enjoin executive overreach even
where proven are, as Benjamin Spencer argues, a “call for the federal courts to
abdicate [the] judicial check on the executive branch.”116
Ironically, the novelty critique also helped the Trump administration make
superficially bipartisan overtures117 aimed at uniting left and right against the
nationwide injunction and, ultimately, the judiciary. Citing the fact that the Obama
administration also encountered more nationwide injunctions than its predecessors,
Trump and his surrogates claimed that nationwide injunctions are a “bipartisan
problem,” symptomatic of judicial rather than executive overreach.118 The supposed
novelty of the remedy does a lot of work here—it creates fictive common ground
between Obama and Trump’s most ardent supporters, groups that are politically
dissimilar, but united in seeing the nationwide injunction as the calling card of activist
judges run amok.119
The novelty critique also helped the Trump administration blame nationwide
injunctions for sowing chaos in the courts, covering up the fact that the true culprit
was the administration’s abusive litigation tactics. As Stephen Vladeck has
documented, Trump’s longest-serving Solicitor General, Noel Francisco, aggressively
asked the Supreme Court for an unprecedented number of emergency stays where
nationwide injunctions have issued on the pretense that there is a mounting crisis
caused by the new nationwide injunction remedy.120 For the most part, the Court

114 Hawaii v. Trump, 241 F. Supp. 3d 1119, 1122–23 (D. Haw. 2017), aff’d in part, vacated in
part, 859 F.3d 741, 761 (9th Cir. 2017), cert. granted, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018) (Mem.).
115 Charlie Savage, Jeff Sessions Dismisses Hawaii as ‘an Island in the Pacific,’ N.Y. TIMES
(Apr. 20, 2017), https://www.nytimes.com/2017/04/20/us/politics/jeff-sessions-judge-hawaiipacific-island.html/ [https://perma.cc/86HR-AYVF].
116 Spencer, supra note 37.
117 See Rendleman, supra note 101, at 900 (“Litigants’ views of national government
injunctions usually depend on their views of the substantive merits in the lawsuit and whether
they are a winning plaintiff or losing defendant. Because politicians are on both winning and
losing sides of lawsuits, the national government injunction is bipartisan.”).
118 See, e.g., Jeff Sessions, Nationwide Injunctions Are a Threat to Our Constitutional Order,
NAT’L REV. (Mar. 10, 2018), https://www.nationalreview.com/2018/03/nationwideinjunctions-stop-elected-branches-enforcing-law/ [https://perma.cc/96L8-G5RR] (“This is not
a political or partisan issue. After all, this has been a problem for administrations of both parties.
Until President Trump, the President with the most nationwide injunctions was President
Obama. Before him, it was President Clinton.”).
119 See, e.g., Millhiser, supra note 27.
120 See Stephen I. Vladeck, The Solicitor General and the Shadow Docket, 133 HARV. L. REV.
123, 153–55 (2019).
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acquiesced to Francisco’s demands.121 Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence in Department
of Homeland Security shows how novelty shifts blame for litigation from the Trump
administration, where it properly belongs, onto the judiciary. To refresh, Gorsuch
supported staying the nationwide injunctions at issue because, to his eye, the new
nationwide injunction remedy had caused chaos below.122 But Gorsuch misdiagnoses
the problem—as the District of Columbia later explained, the chaos Justice Gorsuch
decried “was a product not of a nationwide injunction, which would quickly settle
legal issues at play once and for all potential plaintiffs, but of emergency appeals by
the federal government seeking stays of nationwide injunctions entered by district
courts.”123
C. How Novelty Fails to Explain Problems with Nationwide Injunctions
There is one critical respect in which the novelty critique fails—the problems we
encounter with nationwide injunctions are not necessarily unique to the remedy let
alone caused by its supposed novelty.
In his concurrence in Department of Homeland Security v. New York, Justice
Gorsuch makes an empirical claim about the remedy—that the nationwide
injunction’s novelty explains why they create problems that are otherwise not tolerable
in federal litigation.124 Specifically, he argues that nationwide injunctions perversely
incentivize forum-shopping,125 can give rise to conflicting injunctions,126 interfere
with non-party rights,127 depress percolation of issues in lower courts,128 and weaken

121 Id. at 134 (“Of the twenty-one stay applications, twelve sought to allow a policy that had
been subjected to a nationwide injunction to remain in place, and six of the nine petitions for
certiorari before judgment invoked the unique harm caused by nationwide relief as the reason
the Court should bypass the courts of appeals.”).
122 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring)
(“[T]he routine issuance of universal injunctions is patently unworkable, sowing chaos for
litigants, the government, courts, and all those affected by . . . conflicting decisions.”).
123 District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 53 (D.D.C. 2020).
124 Dep’t of Homeland Sec., 140 S. Ct. at 600–01 (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
125 Id. at 601 (“Because plaintiffs generally are not bound by adverse decisions to which they
were not a party, there is nearly boundless opportunity to shop for a friendly forum to secure a
win nationwide.”).
126 Id. (“The risk of winning conflicting nationwide injunctions is real too.”).
127 Id. at 600 (claiming nationwide injunctions are atypical insofar as they afford relief not
“limited to the parties”).
128 Id. (“By their nature, universal injunctions tend to force judges into making rushed, highstakes, low information decisions. The traditional system of lower courts issuing interlocutory
relief limited to the parties at hand may require litigants and courts to tolerate interim uncertainty
about a rule’s final fate and proceed more slowly until this Court speaks in a case of its own.”).
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the certiorari process.129 However, these problems are not unique to nationwide
injunctions.
In some nationwide injunction suits there is clear evidence that plaintiffs forumor judge-shopped their way to an injunction.130 Both tactics are problematic because
they undermine the legitimacy of judicial proceedings and threaten public confidence
in the courts.131 But these abuses are made possible not by the remedy but by
background rules that govern federal litigation more broadly. Forum-shopping is
facilitated in part by our belief that plaintiffs should be masters of their cases, entitling
them, within some limits, to openly jury- and law-shop.132 And federal rules already
permit forum-shopping where civil suits are brought against federal officers or the
government.133 Judge-shopping is facilitated by the power our federal system gives to
district courts to manage their internal affairs. As Alex Botoman explains, fifty-five
of the nation’s ninety-four federal district courts are subdivided into geographic
divisions that are used for judge-assignment.134 This creates mini district courts within
a district, each with its own judges. In these districts, litigants can select the pool of
judges eligible to be assigned to their cases by strategically choosing the division in
which they file.135
Nationwide injunctions also sometimes lead to conflicting injunctions and orders,
both of which are problematic because they sow confusion for the litigants, imperil
the orderly administration of justice and waste precious judicial resources,136 and put

129 Id. (construing the normal practice as encouraging the “airing of competing views that aids
this Court’s own decision-making process”).
130 See, e.g., Alex Botoman, Divisional Judge-Shopping, 49 COLUM. HUM. RTS. L. REV. 297
(2018) (discussing how the State of Texas exploited divisional judge-assignment systems to
secure favorable judges in three cases challenging Obama administrative initiatives).
131 Kimberly Jade Norwood, Shopping for Venue: The Need for More Limits on Choice, 50 U.
MIAMI L. REV. 267, 304–05 (1996); Theodore Eisenberg & Lynn M. LoPucki, Shopping for
Judges: An Empirical Analysis of Venue Choice in Large Chapter 11 Reorganizations, 84
CORNELL L. REV. 967, 971 (1999) (noting that judge shopping “undermines the aphorism that
‘ours is a government of laws, not men’”).
132 See, e.g., Note, Forum Shopping Reconsidered, 103 HARV. L. REV. 1677, 1680 (1990)
(“Despite the widespread availability of forum shopping, courts and legislatures routinely
denounce it. In fact, however, courts tolerate forum shopping in some types of cases more than
in others. Thus, courts may be troubled not so much by the practice of forum shopping per se
as by its results or its implications about society and the judicial system.”); J. Skelly Wright,
The Federal Courts and the Nature and Quality of State Law, 13 WAYNE L. REV. 317, 333
(1967) (“The lack of uniformity in state and substantive law, compounded by proliferation of
state long-arm statutes, has made forum-shopping, among both federal and state courts, a
national legal pastime.”).
133 28 U.S.C. §1391(e)(1).
134 Botoman, supra note 130, at 299.
135 Id.
136 Cf. M. Devon Moore, The Preliminary Injunction Standard: Understanding the Public
Interest Factor, 117 MICH. L. REV. 939, 960 (2019).
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parties in the position of being held in contempt of court no matter which injunction
or order they obey.137 But these problems are not unique to nationwide injunction suits.
Both problems arise in non-nationwide injunction suits where two or more district
courts exercise jurisdiction over the same issue and there is an overlap of at least some
of the parties. Moreover, nationwide injunctions do not always give fruit to conflicting
injunctions and orders. Other commentators have noted that despite the increased
issuance of nationwide injunctions in the last few decades, conflicting injunctions
have proved to be rare “in part because the comity doctrine requires judges to avoid
issuing such injunctions when possible, and in part because courts can and do alter
their injunctions when they learn of such conflicts.”138
Due to their breath, nationwide injunctions suits can also sometimes infringe on
the rights of non-parties. But their breadth is not always problematic. As Spencer
Amdur and David Hausman point out, broad remedies seeking relief for large,
dispersed victim classes are sometimes the only meaningful way to prevent serious
injuries of a nationwide scale.139 Moreover, nationwide injunctions’ breadth is not a
new innovation. Equity has long permitted actions that settle the rights of upwards of
tens of thousands of similarly situated persons.140
There is some merit to the critique that nationwide injunctions can stifle the
percolation of issues in the lower courts. The Seventh Circuit pointed to this problem
in City of Chicago v. Sessions, and reflected:
When relief is limited in geographic scope, multiple cases may be filed in
numerous jurisdictions, and the reviewing courts may therefore gain a wider range of
perspectives and the opportunity to explore the impact of those legal issues in other

137 Frost, supra note 1, at 1106.
138 See Bray, supra note 9, at 463 (noting that typically one of the judges who issued conflicting
injunctions “backs down, narrowing or staying one of the issued injunctions, or else an appellate
court reverses one of them”); see also W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Loc. 24, 751 F.2d
721, 728 (5th Cir. 1985) (principle of comity requires that courts of “coordinate jurisdiction and
equal rank . . . exercise care to avoid interference with each other’s affairs”); United States v.
AMC Ent., Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 771–73 (9th Cir. 2008) (describing policy rationale of limiting
injunctions to geographic jurisdiction in cases in which other circuits have issued conflicting
rulings).
139 David Hausman & Spencer Amdur, Nationwide Injunctions and Nationwide Harm, 131
HARV. L. REV. F. 49, 51 (2017) (“Some government policies, like President Trump’s travel ban,
threaten immediate and lasting damage. They go into effect quickly, and their impact cannot be
reversed at the end of a lawsuit. Anyone who does not or cannot bring her own case can only
be protected if a court concludes the policy is illegal and fully enjoins it. Preventing widespread
and illegal injuries is a good thing, especially when the government and others would not be
much harmed in the process.”).
140 Brief of Amici Curiae Legal Historians in Support of Plaintiff and Appellee the City of
Chicago, supra note 51, at 27–28 (discussing, as one example, the Rail Strike Injunction issued
by a federal judge in Chicago in 1922, which enjoined “all railway employees, attorneys,
servants, union agents, associates and members and all persons acting in aid or in conjunction
with them” nationwide—at least 400,000 people—from doing anything that could possibly
support the then-ongoing railroad strike, including “loitering,” “picketing,” and “encouraging”
anyone to interfere with the functioning of the railroads).
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factual contexts. That process may be truncated, however, if a district court issues a
nationwide injunction.141
But this problem is not necessarily unique to nationwide injunctions. For instance,
suits brought against the federal government seeking a declaratory judgment
interpreting a federal statute similarly depress percolation of issues. Similarly, suits
with large plaintiff classes can similarly depress the percolation of issues across lower
courts.142
There is also some merit to the proposition that nationwide injunctions weaken the
certiorari process. Nationwide injunctions can send the Court a false signal, making it
seem as if there is uniformity between the circuits on a particular legal issue.
Depressed percolation of issues in the lower courts can deprive the court of a robust
body of decisions to inform its own decision-making and, as a result, weaken the
certiorari process.143 But these problems are not necessarily unique to nationwide
injunctions. Among other things, the Court can weaken the process itself if it takes too
many petitions for certiorari before judgment, as it has with nationwide injunction
suits recently.144
In sum, the disconnect between the novelty critique and claimed problems with
nationwide injunctions matters. Among other things, it suggests something else was
at play driving the Trump administration’s crusade against the nationwide injunction;
flimsy problems do not justify overcorrection of eliminating the remedy. There is also
a common theme among these not real problems—all seem to speak to anxiety about
the judiciary’s legitimacy and capacity of our modern-day chancellors to make the
right call when sitting in equity. Even if the supposed problems are blown out of
proportion, the judiciary might need to be attentive to the anxiety to shore up its
institutional legitimacy.

141 City of Chicago v. Sessions, 888 F.3d 272, 288 (7th Cir. 2018).
142 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1972) (noting that nationwide classes “have a
detrimental effect by foreclosing adjudication by a number of different courts and judges”).
143 See Getzel Berger, Nationwide Injunctions Against the Federal Government: A Structural
Approach, 92 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1068, 1087–88 (2017); see also SAMUEL ESTREICHER & JOHN
SEXTON, REDEFINING THE SUPREME COURT’S ROLE 48 (1986) (explaining that the Court benefits
from the experience of the lower courts—by virtue of encountering the same issues in wildly
different contexts, they communicate “concrete information about how a particular rule will
‘write,’ its capacity for dealing with varying fact patterns, and the merits of alternative
approaches”); Patricia M. Wald, Upstairs/Downstairs at the Supreme Court: Implications of the
1991 Term for the Constitutional Work of the Lower Courts, 61 U. CIN. L. REV. 771, 790 (1993)
(observing that percolation allows the Court to “take advantage of a wide spectrum of reasoning
and analysis on the subject as well as a variety of factual settings in which the issue may have
arisen”); Arizona v. Evans, 514 U.S. 1, 23 n.1 (1995) (Ginsburg, J., dissenting) (“[W]hen
frontier legal problems are presented, periods of ‘percolation’ in, and diverse opinions from,
state and federal appellate courts may yield a better informed and more enduring final
pronouncement by this Court.”).
144 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 923 (2018).
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III. FEDERAL EQUITY POWER AND NATIONWIDE INJUNCTIONS
This Part endeavors to reclaim the nationwide injunction as a valid exercise of
federal equity. In service of that goal, I explore the source and scope of federal equity
jurisdiction and powers and Supreme Court caselaw expounding upon the same.
Ultimately, historical and doctrinal context and critique show why nationwide
injunctions are constitutional.
A. Article III’s Equity
I would like to suggest that federal equity is quite expansive—in exceptional cases,
it extends as far as necessary to give justice to the parties. This clear, simple limit is
set by Article III and evidenced by contemporary writings of the Framers and has been
readily recognized by the Supreme Court, albeit with some equivocation, from the
early Republic to present.
The expansiveness of our equity may seem surprising given present anxieties about
the appropriate role of federal judges. Somewhat ironically, in our turbulent times, the
notion that our equity is dynamic enough to meet the exigencies of the moment may
seem untoward to some. Unfortunately, a growing number of commentators prescribe
a radical, historically dubious, and doctrinally unsound measure to guard against
potential abuses of the equity power—they invented a fiction that our equity is now
and always has been rigidly delimited by the equity of the English Chancellor circa
1789. Some commentators are even so bold as to suggest that the Supreme Court has
recognized as much in an unbroken set of precedents since the founding of the
Republic.145 To put a very fine point on it, these commentators’ arguments are utterly
ridiculous.
Let us begin by assessing evidence reflecting federal equity’s limits.
Article III’s text is a good starting place. Article III unqualifiedly vests the
judiciary with the power to hear cases arising in “equity.”146 Aside from granting
Congress the power to create and set the jurisdiction of the lower courts, the
Constitution does not expressly delineate the remedies courts may award or set hard
procedural limits. Textually, it is strange to read Article III’s broad, unencumbered
grant as being limited by the kind of equity practiced in the English Chancery Court
circa 1789. Article III does not make any express reference to the English Chancellor
or the Chancery Court, or any other equity tradition for that matter.
For what it’s worth, evidence of the Framers’ intent similarly weighs against
construing Article III as importing idiosyncratic limits of the English Chancellor onto

145 See, e.g., Michael T. Morley, The Federal Equity Power, 59 B.C. L. REV. 217, 224 (2018).
146 U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. (“The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and
Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or
which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public
Ministers and Consuls; —to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction; —to
Controversies to which the United States shall be a Party; —to Controversies between two or
more States; —between a State and Citizens of another State; —between Citizens of different
States; —between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States,
and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens, or Subjects.”); see
also Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695 (1992) (“This section delineates the absolute
limits on the federal courts’ jurisdiction.”).
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federal equity.147 The Framers designed the federal judiciary to serve the unique needs
of our Republic. While each state retained the power to create local law and, at its
option, could maintain courts of law and equity, the national courts were calibrated to
promote the interests of the American people and mediate disputes of national import
between and among the states and their citizens.148 In this vein, Constitutional
Convention delegate William Samuel Johnson, a Connecticut lawyer and skilled
equity practitioner, proposed that the judiciary be vested with both legal and equitable
jurisdiction and the contours of the lower courts’ equity jurisdiction be undefined, left
to Congress to delimit.149 Johnson’s proposal was ultimately adopted and incorporated
into Article III.150 The available historical record reflects that the Framers intended
that the national courts have the requisite powers in extraordinary cases, where
positive law fell short, to ensure justice could be done by the parties.151 They
understood that Article III would confer the judiciary with expansive equity
jurisdiction and powers, entrusting the federal courts to decree equitable remedies,
thus enlarging their discretion when sitting in equity.152

147 Thank you to Michael Dorf for pointing out that this observation harmonizes with the
Supreme Court’s construction of the Seventh Amendment. As one example, in Galloway v.
United States, the Court rejected the notion that directed verdicts are unconstitutional. There,
the Court reasons that the availability of directed verdicts in English practice at the time of
ratification is not dispositive because the Seventh Amendment did not import wholecloth
English common law procedure, standards of proof, or evidentiary rules. 319 U.S. 372, 388–92
(1943).
148 In Federalist Paper 80, Hamilton further elucidates the necessity of and inherent limits of
federal equity. THE FEDERALIST NO. 80 (Alexander Hamilton). There, he explains that some
lawsuits brought under the Constitution and federal laws that do not “involve those ingredients
of FRAUD, ACCIDENT, TRUST, or HARDSHIP” may contain inequity, therefore federal
courts need equitable jurisdiction. Id.
149 PETER CHARLES HOFFER, THE LAW’S CONSCIENCE: EQUITABLE CONSTITUTIONALISM
AMERICA 95 (1990).

IN

150 Id.
151 Alexander Hamilton said as much in Federalist Paper No. 83, where he signals that the
animating purpose of federal equity is to temper against the harsh results of rote application of
positive law. In that vein, Hamilton explains “[t]he great and primary use of a court of equity is
to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to general rules.” THE FEDERALIST
NO. 83 (Alexander Hamilton). Hamilton’s commentary echoes Aristotle’s understanding of
equity being a justice that goes beyond written law necessary because positive law is always a
general statement, yet there are cases which it is not possible to cover in a general statement.
ARISTOTLE, NICOMACHEAN ETHICS bk. V, at 313, 315 (T.E. Page et al. eds., H. Rackham trans.,
Harvard Univ. Press rev. ed. 1934) (c. 350 B.C.E.). Aristotle spoke of the need for “rectification
of legal justice.” Id. at 315. Equity thus complements positive laws’ virtues, they are not in
competition. Both are necessary to achieve Justice. For a superb exposition of Aristotle’s
conception of equity, see Anton-Hermann Chroust, Aristotle’s Conception of Equity
(Epieikeia), 18 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 119 (1942).
152 HOFFER, supra note 149, at 94.
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Supreme Court caselaw also reflects that federal equity is expansive. Though, in
some respects, the Court has said that federal equity is informed by tradition, it is not
strictly delimited by the idiosyncratic limits of the historic English Chancellor.
The Court’s earliest cases, decided between 1789 and 1801, teach that Article III
vests the judiciary with expansive equity jurisdiction and powers. Though at times the
Court acknowledges federal equity draws upon English Chancery practices as they
existed at the time of ratification, it is steadfast that this is not constitutionally
compelled. For instance, in Georgia v. Brailsford, the Court describes English equity
as “affording outlines for the practice of this court” but clarifies the Court has the
power to “make such alterations . . . as circumstances may render necessary.”153
Grayson v. Virginia teaches that it is within the “powers vested in this Court” to
“adapt” general process and rules of equity inherited from England “to the peculiar
circumstances of this country, subject to the interposition, alternation, and control, of
the Legislature.”154
As the Court’s equity jurisprudence matures, a through-line emerges—federal
equity extends as far as necessary to ensure justice to the parties. In case after case,
the Court hammers that federal equity is dynamic. For instance, the Court holds in
Seymour v. Freer that “a court of equity ha[s] unquestionable authority to apply its
flexible and comprehensive jurisdiction in such manner as might be necessary to the
right administration of justice between the parties.”155 This dynamic conception of
federal equity crops up again in Union Pacific Railway v. Chicago, Rock Island &
Pacific Railway, which teaches that equity evolves overtime “in order to meet the
requirements of every case, and to satisfy the needs of a progressive social condition
in which new primary rights and duties are constantly arising and new kinds of wrongs
are constantly committed.”156 And again in Hecht Co. v. Bowles, which underscores
that “[f]lexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished [federal equity jurisdiction].”157
When justice demands it, the Court finds itself free to construe federal equity as
reaching injuries and affording remedies that were beyond the historic English
Chancellor. One example is injunctions against executive officers. Historically, the
English Chancellor derived his authority from the Crown and consequently had no
power to enjoin the Crown.158 Despite that limit in the English tradition, the Court has
repeatedly held federal courts are empowered to issue injunctions against executive
branch officers.159 The Court has also approved innovative uses of old remedies. One

153 Georgia v. Brailsford, 2 U.S. (2 Dall.) 402, 414 (1792).
154 Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 320 (1796).
155 Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 202, 218 (1869); see also Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76
U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 807 (1870) (noting that federal courts must rely on their “flexible jurisdiction
in equity . . . to protect all rights and do justice to all concerned”).
156 Union P. Ry. Co. v. Chi., Rock Island & P. Ry. Co., 163 U.S. 564, 601 (1896).
157 Hecht Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944).
158 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 1003.
159 See, e.g., Shields v. Utah Idaho Cent. R.R. Co., 305 U.S. 177, 183–84 (1938) (holding
railway could sue for injunction against federal officers to restrain prosecution for violation of
federal law); Miguel v. McCarl, 291 U.S. 442, 455–56 (1934) (enjoining federal officers from
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example is the antisuit injunction against enforcement made famous in Ex Parte
Young.160 As Mila Sohini explains, that remedy was “heralded as an innovation
precisely because it used ’a traditional tool of equity—the antisuit injunction—in a
highly nontraditional way: to bar the bringing of an enforcement action, which is to
say, the non-tortious filing of a complaint by an attorney general of a state.”161
There are some opinions where the Supreme Court invokes the English Chancellor
in a curious way that merits some explanation. In these cases, the Court goes so far as
to say, expressly, that a particular result is compelled because it was the practice of
the historic Chancellor or part of the English tradition. These kinds of statements,
however, should not be taken literally. Additional context reflects that, in many
instances where this happens, the Court invokes the Chancellor to help legitimize an
innovation in federal equity, not to usher in some constitutionally mandated return to
English equity circa 1789.
As one example, in the early nineteenth century, the Court issued a series of
opinions establishing a uniform body of nonstate equity principles covering procedure,
remedies, and even some primary rights and liabilities. This was a drastic change, and
a much-needed innovation at the time. Kristen Collins does a superb job fleshing out
how the Court saw a need for a uniform body of federal equity law, realized reform
was not forthcoming through legislation, and ultimately indulged in a bit of self-help,
crafting a uniform single body of federal equity law informed by federal and English
sources, and details how repeated congressional acquiescence made this possible.162
For my purposes, I want to focus narrowly on how the Court went about rhetorically
legitimizing this move in its opinions. Curiously enough, the Court repeatedly invokes
the English Chancellor. For instance, in Payne v. Hook, by way of explaining that
federal equity is national and cannot be encumbered by variances of state equity, the
Court proffers that the “equity jurisdiction conferred on the Federal courts is the same
that the High Court of Chancery in England possesses.”163 Historic English
distinctions between law and equity are also invoked in Robinson v. Campbell,164

withholding retired military pay and allowances); Am. Sch. of Magnetic Healing v. McAnnulty,
187 U.S. 94, 110–11 (1902) (enjoining the Postmaster General from withholding mail).
160 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
161 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 1003–04.
162 See generally Kristin A. Collins, “A Considerable Surgical Operation”: Article III, Equity,
and Judge-Made Law in the Federal Courts, 60 DUKE L.J. 249 (2010).
163 Payne v. Hook, 74 U.S. (7 Wall.) 425, 430 (1869); see also Kirby v. Lake Shore & M.S.R.
Co., 120 U.S. 130, 138 (1887) (invoking Payne v. Hook and further pointing to the holding’s
explanatory power vis-à-vis the uniformity of federal equity, noting that “[u]pon any other
theory the equity jurisdiction of the courts of the United States could not be exercised according
to rules and principles alike in every state”).
164 Robinson v. Campbell, 16 U.S. (3 Wheat.) 212, 222–23 (1818) (Marshall, C.J.) (holding
defendant could not assert equitable title to land in common-law ejectment action in federal
court because “remedies in the courts of the United States, are to be, at common law or in equity,
not according to the practice of state courts, but according to the principles of common law and
equity, as distinguished and defined in that country from which we derive our knowledge of
those principles”).
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Mississippi Mills v. Cohn,165 and Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow166 to similar
effect—to drive home that federal equity jurisdiction is set by the Constitution, which
recognizes a distinction between law and equity as was the practice in England and
vests federal courts with jurisdiction over both such that it cannot be encumbered by
states extending legal or equitable jurisdiction to local tribunals.
The Court has resorted to artificial histories of equity on several other occasions.
For instance, the Court condoned the antilabor injunction challenged in In re Debs, a
remedy foreign to both English and American practice,167 on the rationale that it was
of a kind “recognized from ancient time and by indubitable authority.”168 Similarly, in
York v. Guaranty Trust, the Court announced the “outcome determinative” test,
extending the Erie principle to federal cases in which equitable remedies were
sought,169 which eviscerated the uniform federal equity doctrine established by Payne
and its progeny. Guaranty Trust makes this move, in part, by disavowing the existence
of a long history of federal judicial “power [in equity] to deny substantive rights
created by State law or to create substantive rights denied by State law.”170 As Collins

165 Miss. Mills v. Cohn, 150 U.S. 202, 206 (1893) (holding the plaintiff’s equity claim could
be heard in federal court even though state statutes vested local courts with concomitant
jurisdiction; referencing in part that the historic distinction between law and equity “as
distinguished and defined in the mother country at the time of the adoption of the constitution
of the United States,” as a means to explain that federal equity jurisdiction cannot be impaired
by state legislatures’ vesting of law jurisdiction over the same matters in state courts).
166 Sheffield Furnace Co. v. Witherow, 149 U.S. 574, 579 (1893) (holding federal court could
hear bill in equity to hear mechanic’s lien even though state statutes vested local courts with
concomitant jurisdiction).
167 As one commentator explains:
Labor injunctions broke the traditional rules governing injunctions in
several notable ways. The labor injunctions expanded the notion of property
well beyond its traditional confines. Also, while injunctions traditionally
were narrow remedies, the labor injunctions were very broad in terms of the
acts proscribed, and the number of people bound. Furthermore, equitable
remedies traditionally could not be obtained where there would be adequate
remedy available at law. Nonetheless, the labor injunctions generally drew
upon the authority of criminal statutes, so that criminal prosecution could
have addressed many of the strikes. [Seemingly], courts were willing to
expand these injunctions beyond their historical confines because the
injunction’s power, flexibility, and prospectivity made the device uniquely
Suited to protect the interests of business from disruptive labor movements.
Daniel J. Walker, Note, Administrative Injunctions: Assessing the Propriety of Non-Class
Collective Relief, 90 CORNELL L. REV. 1119, 1131 (2005).
168 In re Debs, 158 U.S. 564, 599 (1895).
169 York v. Guar. Tr., 326 U.S. 99, 109 (1945).
170 Id. at 105.

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/7

34

2021]

THE CHANCELLORS ARE ALRIGHT

893

explains, this was done, largely, to “craft a story of continuity concerning the metes
and bounds of nonstate, judge made law in federal courts.”171
On balance, it appears that the Court has invoked the Chancellor at times when it
needs to rhetorically legitimize innovations in equity. These cases reflect a curious but
consistent deployment of the English Chancellor, not as a historical figure
demarcating the metes and bounds of federal equity, but rather as a figure embodying
equity’s aspirational aims.172 The English Chancellor operates as a symbol of equity’s
overarching commitments to justice and fairness. He represents a promise by our
modern-day chancellors that their conscience is guided by a measure of stability and
a capacity for change that are characteristic of equity’s long tradition.173
Despite the rhetorical force of invoking the English Chancellor, the Court has on
several occasions clarified that federal equity is informed by, but not starkly delimited
by English practice. For instance, in Atlas Life Insurance Co. v. Wisconsin Southern,
Inc.,174 where an insurer tried to avail itself of federal equity jurisdiction to raise a
defense to a policy not available in state court, the Court explains that federal equity
jurisdiction is informed by the “principles” of the “system of judicial remedies”
“devised [and] administered” by the English Court of Chancery at the birth of the
Republic.175 But the Court softens the English connection, clarifying that it “guide[s]
their decisions and enable[s] them to determine whether in any given instance a suit
of which a district court has jurisdiction as a federal court is an appropriate one for the
exercise of the extraordinary powers of a court of equity.”176
In Grupo Mexicano de Desarrollo, SA v. Alliance Bond Fund, Inc., the Court also
recognizes that the limits of federal equity are informed by tradition but clarifies that
English practice is but one consideration.177 In holding that federal courts lack the
equity jurisdiction to award asset-freezing injunctions before judgment, also known
as Mareva-type injunctions, Justice Scalia explains that the limits of Article III’s
equity are divined by looking at historic English practice and that of the federal courts

171 Collins, supra note 162, at 338.
172 Cf. Samuel L. Bray, The Supreme Court and the New Equity, 68 VAND. L. REV. 997, 1018–
19 (2015) (“What the Court is constructing might be called an artificial history of equity. . . . It
glosses, and glosses over, the real complexity of equity’s past.”).
173 Id. at 1023.
174 Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568 (1939) (“The ‘jurisdiction’ thus
conferred on the federal courts to entertain suits in equity is an authority to administer in equity
suits the principles of the system of judicial remedies which had been devised and was being
administered by the English Court of Chancery at the time of the separation of the two countries.
[The Judiciary Act of 1789] does not define the jurisdiction of the district courts as federal
courts, in the sense of their power or authority to hear and decide, but prescribes the body of
doctrine which is to guide their decisions and enable them to determine whether in any given
instance a suit of which a district court has jurisdiction as a federal court is an appropriate one
for the exercise of the extraordinary powers of a court of equity.”).
175 Id.
176 Id.
177 Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308 (1999).
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as well as the equitable ramifications of extending federal equity to a previously
unknown remedy.178 Thus, though the practices of the historic English Chancellor has
some bearing on how Article III’s limits are construed, it is but one factor and not
itself dispositive. In recognizing that the contours of federal equity are informed by
historic English practice but adapted to the unique needs of our Republic,179 Grupo
Mexicano falls in line with Grayson180 and its progeny. (This insight also explains why
Justice Scalia reasoned Mareva injunctions were beyond the limits of Article III
despite the fact that, decades earlier, English courts had found them within the limits
of English equity.181)
The limited influence of English practice on the metes and bounds of federal equity
is more strikingly apparent in the Court’s domestic relations and probate cases. Over
the last century, the Court has taken pains to clarify in these cases that federal equity
jurisdiction is not exclusively defined by the historic limits of the English Chancellor.
Context helps explain why this was necessary in the first place. Starting in the midnineteenth century, the Court issued several decisions approving of lower federal
courts abstaining from exercising jurisdiction over probate and domestic relations
cases that raised important federalism concerns when sitting in equity.182 However,
the Court’s equivocation about two distinct concepts—the ancient power of courts

178 Three factors thus inform the analysis: (a) whether the remedy was unknown to the English
Chancellor of 1789, (b) whether federal and state courts had consistently denied Mareva-type
relief throughout the twentieth-century, and (c) whether Mareva-type injunctions, if allowed,
would alter the procedural and substantive rights of creditors relative to debtors. See id. at 322–
23.
179 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 1006 n.554 (observing the same).
180 Grayson v. Virginia, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 320, 320 (1796).
181 See Mareva Compania Naviera SA v. Int’l Bulkcarriers SA [1980] 1 All ER 213 (CA). For
in-depth accounts of the emergence of the Mareva injunction, see John Stevens, Equity’s
Manhattan Project: The Creation and Evolution of the Mareva Injunction, 14 DENNING L.J. 25
(1999) and David Capper, The Mareva Injunction — From Birth to Adulthood, in LEADING
CASES OF THE TWENTIETH CENTURY 255 (Eoin O’Dell ed., 2000). It should be noted that lawyers
in common law jurisdictions have long critiqued Scalia’s understanding of the Mareva case and
the history of the remedy set forth in Grupo Mexicano. See, e.g., Lawrence Collins, United
States Supreme Court Rejects Mareva Jurisdiction, 115 L.Q. REV. 601, 604 (1999) (noting that
“from an English viewpoint, the discussion . . . of the Mareva jurisdiction seems to be superficial
and based on obsolete material”); David Capper, The Need for Mareva Injunctions
Reconsidered, 73 FORDHAM L. REV. 2161, 2166–76 (1999) (pointing to several errors and
omissions in Scalia’s analysis in Grupo Mexicano).
182 See, e.g., Barber v. Barber, 62 U.S. (21 How.) 582, 584 (1859) (“We disclaim altogether
any jurisdiction in the courts of the United States upon the subject of divorce, or for the
allowance of alimony, either as an original proceeding in chancery or as an incident to divorce
a vinculo, or to one from bed and board.”); De la Rama v. De la Rama, 201 U.S. 303, 307 (1906)
(claiming “long established rule” that federal courts lack jurisdiction over certain domestic
relations matters premised on the assumptions that “husband and wife cannot usually be citizens
of different States, so long as the marriage relation continues (a rule which has been somewhat
relaxed in recent cases), and for the further reason that a suit for divorce in itself involves no
pecuniary value”).
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sitting in equity to decline to exercise jurisdiction in certain circumstances183 and the
historic English Chancellor as a symbol to legitimize new equity decisions—sowed
confusion. For a period, the Court’s decisions intimated that Article III, informed by
“misty understandings of English legal history,” did not extend to either probate or
domestic relations cases. 184 The Court later corrected course, rejecting the notion that
implicit historic limits should be read onto Article III’s otherwise expansive grant of
jurisdiction. In Ankenbrandt v. Richards,185 the Court recognized that because Article
III does not expressly reserve jurisdiction over domestic relations matters, the
exception is not constitutionally mandated186 and deemed the “historical debate over
whether the English court of chancery had jurisdiction to handle certain domestic
relations matters” irrelevant.187 Similarly, in Marshall v. Marshall, the Court deemed
the “historical debate” over the practices of the “English Court of Chancery” irrelevant
to assessing whether, constitutionally, federal courts had jurisdiction over equitable
claims arising in the probate context.188
Other aspects of the Court’s jurisprudence reflect that Article III’s equity is in
some important respects totally different from that of the historic English Chancellor.
One example is the so-called adequacy requirement. In traditional English practice,
the Chancellor inherently lacked jurisdiction over matters in which there was an
“adequate” legal remedy available.189 Not so with Article III’s equity. The
Constitution extends unencumbered equitable jurisdiction to the federal courts. We do
have an adequacy requirement, but it is statutory. Shortly after the Constitution was
ratified, Congress enacted the Judiciary Act of 1789, which created the lower federal
courts and conditioned their jurisdiction over equity matters such that it could only be
exercised where there is no adequate legal remedy available.190 Sometimes, the federal
adequacy requirement, because it is very old, is spoken of as if it is constitutional. But
that is not quite right. Congress enacted the adequacy requirement pursuant to its

183 The abstention power is a narrow but important exception to the general rule that federal
courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction given them.” Colo.
River Water Conservation v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1976) (citing England v. La.
State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); then citing McClellan v. Carland, 217
U.S. 268, 281 (1910); and then citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
184 Marshall v. Marshall, 547 U.S. 293, 299 (2006) (Ginsburg, J.) (characterizing error).
185 Ankenbrandt v. Richards, 504 U.S. 689, 695–96 (1992).
186 Id.
187 Id. at 699–700.
188 Marshall, 547 U.S. at 308–09.
189 F. MAITLAND, EQUITY 4–7 (2d rev. ed. 1936) (tracing requirement to early English
Chancery practice).
190 See Atlas Life Ins. Co. v. W.I.S., Inc., 306 U.S. 563, 568–69 (1939) (discussing statutory
origins of adequacy requirement under federal law).
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Constitutional power to set the lower courts’ jurisdiction; it could exercise that same
power at any time to lift or alter it, just like any other statute.191
Another key difference is the role the Supreme Court plays in shaping federal
equity. When the Constitution was ratified in 1789, there was one English Chancellor
who had jurisdiction over all equity cases in the realm.192 Appeals, if heard, were
brought directly to the Crown, as famously occurred in 1616 when King James I issued
a prerogative ostensibly affirming Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s 1515 opinion in the
Earl of Oxford’s Case.193 Article III sets up a totally different kind of system. It vests
all federal courts with the same equity powers, giving us multiple chancellors hearing
equity cases concurrently. Additionally, as Justice Iredell explains in his concurrence
to Sims’ Lessee, Article III’s election to vest both law and equity powers “in the very
same Courts” puts unique pressures on our national judiciary requiring, at times, the
Supreme Court to play a coordinating role as our Chief Chancellor.194
Owing to its positional authority as the Chief Chancellor, the Supreme Court from
time to time creates uniform rules to help guide the discretion of the inferior
chancellors. These rules are, more often than not, fashioned to promote uniformity
across the national equity courts, a problem that did not arise in England’s unitary
system. Given this unique need, the Court’s cases that aim to promote uniformity in
federal equity practice often have no real connection to historic English practice. As
one example, in the early aughts the Supreme Court introduced new, uniform multifactor tests to guide the lower courts’ exercise of discretion in issuing preliminary
injunctions in Winter v. Natural Resources Defense Council195 and permanent
injunctions in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC.196 Though both preliminary and

191 John Harrison, The Power of Congress to Limit the Jurisdiction of Federal Courts and the
Text of Article III, 64 U. CHI. L. REV. 203, 209 (1997) (“Congress may give [inferior federal
courts] all the jurisdiction the Constitution permits, or none at all, or anything in between, as far
as Article III is concerned.”).
192 Bray, supra note 9, at 420.
193 Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615) 21 Eng. Rep. 485, 486; 1 Chan. Rep. 1, 6; David Ibetson, The
Earl of Oxford’s Case (1615), in LANDMARK CASES IN EQUITY 1, 1–3 (Charles Mitchell & Paul
Mitchell eds., 2012) (exploring in depth the underlying land dispute as well as the convoluted
litigation that eventually gave fruit to Lord Chancellor Ellesmere’s 1515 decision in the Earl of
Oxford’s Case that equity court decisions could override conflicting decisions issued by law
courts, which created direct conflict with an earlier issued disposition of the same land dispute
by Chief Justice Coke of the King’s Bench); GARY WATT, TRUSTS AND EQUITY 6 (2020)
(describing how in 1616 the dispute between Chancellor Ellesmere and Chief Justice Coke was
ostensibly appealed to King James I and, on the advice of his Attorney General, Sir Francis
Bacon, James issued a prerogative approving of Ellesmere’s decision in the Earl of Oxford’s
Case).
194 Sims v. Irvine, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 425 (1799).
195 Winter v. NRDC, Inc., 555 U.S. 7, 20 (2008).
196 eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, LLC, 547 U.S. 388, 391 (2006).
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permanent injunctions have roots in English practice, the multi-factor tests adopted by
the Court are not of English origin.197
The Supreme Court also construes its equity powers to be expansive enough to
permit the creation of totally new remedies unknown in English practice where they
are necessary to salve unique needs arising in our Republic. One example is the
structural injunction. The Court created the structural injunction in the mid-twentieth
century as a tool to redress racial segregation in large public institutions in the wake
of Brown v. Board of Education.198 The Warren Court’s commitment to racial justice
moved it to engage in a transformational process, urging changes in core social
institutions and in so doing revolutionized equity. As Owen Fiss explains:
In time it was understood that desegregation was a total transformational process
in which the judge undertook the reconstruction of an ongoing social institution.
Desegregation required a revision of familiar conceptions about party structure,
new norms governing judicial behavior, and new ways of looking at the
relationship between rights and remedies. No one had a road map at the outset. No
one had a clear vision of all that would be involved in trying to eradicate the caste
system embedded in a state bureaucracy, or how the attempt would transform the
mode of adjudication. It delegated the reconstructive task to the lower federal
judges . . . . They, in turn, discovered what the task required and adjusted
traditional procedural forms to meet the felt necessities. Legitimacy was equated
with need, and, in that sense, procedure became dependent upon substance. It was
the overriding commitment to racial equality that motivated the procedural
innovation and that was seen as the justification for the departures from
tradition.199
Though structural injunctions issue far less frequently than they did in the 1960s
and 1970s, the Court has signaled its unwillingness to do-away with the remedy. And,
the Court has continued to innovate the remedy to solve other, large-scale institutional
problems. For instance, in Brown v. Plata, the Court upheld a structural injunction

197 See, e.g., Caprice L. Roberts, Restitution Rollout: The Restatement (Third) of Restitution &
Unjust Enrichment: The Restitution Revival and the Ghosts of Equity, 68 WASH. & LEE L. REV.
1027, 1037 (2011) (“It was news to remedies and injunctions scholars that the four-factor test
[in eBay and Winter] was the required, ‘traditional,’ ordinarily applied familiar test.”); Mark P.
Gergen et al., The Supreme Court’s Accidental Revolution? The Test for Permanent Injunctions,
112 COLUM. L. REV. 203, 205–06 (2012) (pointing out that traditional equitable practice
embraces principles and concerns beyond the four factors articulated in eBay); Jared A.
Goldstein, Equitable Balancing in the Age of Statutes, 96 VA. L. REV. 485, 492 (2010) (pointing
out that Winter’s insistence that courts balance remedies is a nineteenth century creation, and
that both “English and American courts in the seventeenth, eighteenth, and early nineteenth
centuries neither spoke of balancing the equities nor employed a balancing approach in deciding
whether to grant injunctions.”).
198 Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
199 Owen M. Fiss, Foreword: The Forms of Justice, 93 HARV. L. REV. 1, 3 (1979).

Published by EngagedScholarship@CSU, 2021

39

898

CLEVELAND STATE LAW REVIEW

[69:859

ordering the State of California’s prison system to reduce its population to remedy
systemic Eighth Amendment violations.200
In sum, the suggestion that Article III’s equity is strictly defined by the limits of
the historic English Chancellor has no support in the Constitution’s text, the Framers’
intent, let alone Supreme Court caselaw. Those who insist otherwise are not urging
that we return equity to its roots, but rather wish that we place a curious limit on federal
equity and hope that an artificial history will give it the patina of legitimacy. Appeals
to history, even untrue ones, rhetorically ease “the stultifying task of marking the
limits of judicial power.”201 But, as James Pfander and Jacob Wentzel explain,
A jurisprudence of constitutional remedies that measures the legitimate scope of
modern federal equity by looking to the practices of the High Court of Chancery, circa
1789, will capture only a partial view of the remedies available to suitors in the early
republic. More troubling[,] it may deprive equity of its characteristic ability to adapt
to changes in the remedial system as a whole.202
The costs of these disingenuous histories are simply too great.
B.

Nationwide Injunctions Are Constitutional

Critics of nationwide injunctions raise three primary challenges, any one of which
they insist reflects that nationwide injunctions are unconstitutional. I address each
challenge and ultimately conclude that nationwide injunctions are constitutional.
1.

English Chancellor Objection

The most popular challenge to the constitutionality of nationwide injunctions
proffers that because the nationwide injunction is a remedy unknown to the English
Chancellor at the time the Constitution was ratified in 1789, federal courts lack the
power to issue the remedy today. Justice Thomas’s concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii
embraces a version of this argument. Because, Thomas asserts, no statute expressly
gives federal courts the power to issue nationwide injunctions, the authority to do so
must be located in Article III’s grant of inherent authority to issue equitable relief.203
He goes on to reason that Article III only vests federal courts with the power to issue
remedies that accord with the “traditional rules of equity that existed at the
founding.”204 Because, on Thomas’s view, the “English system of equity did not
contemplate [nationwide] injunctions,” Article III does not vest federal courts with the
power to issue the remedy today.205
However, the fact that the historic English Chancellor did not issue nationwide
injunctions does not evidence the remedy’s unconstitutionality. As discussed at length
200 Brown v. Plata, 563 U.S. 493 (2011).
201 Stephen B. Burbank, The Bitter with the Sweet: Tradition, History, and Limitations on
Federal Judicial Power—A Case Study, 75 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1291, 1294 (2000).
202 James E. Pfander & Jacob P. Wentzel, The Common Law Origins of Ex parte Young, 72
STAN. L. REV. 1269, 1282 (2020).
203 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018).
204 Id. at 2425–26.
205 Id. at 2427.
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supra Section III.A, the metes and bounds of Article III’s equity is not exactly
concomitant with that of the historic English Chancellor. And, as Grupo Mexicano
recognizes, at most, historic English practice informs, but does not singularly delimit
the metes and bounds of Article III’s equity.206 This is why the Court has a long
tradition of permitting remedies that were absolutely unavailable to the Chancellor,
such as injunctions enjoining executive branch officers.
2.

Breadth Objection

Another constitutional challenge has also been floated—that, irrespective of
origin, federal courts are without the power to issue injunctions that reach beyond the
plaintiffs. Justice Gorsuch’s concurrence to Department of Homeland Security v. New
York, the order staying nationwide injunctions of the public-charge rule, embraces a
version of this argument. There, Gorsuch argues that the fact that nationwide
injunctions “direct how the defendant must act toward persons who are not parties to
the case . . . raise[s] serious questions about the scope of courts’ equitable powers
under Article III.”207 The problem, Gorsuch suggests, is that “[e]quitable remedies,
like remedies in general, are meant to redress the injuries sustained by a particular
plaintiff in a particular lawsuit.”208
While the breadth of nationwide injunctions may at times prove administratively
problematic and even invite abusive litigation tactics, it does not render the remedy
unconstitutional. Precedents already establish that equitable remedies can be broad so
long as they are tailored to the violation sown and need not be limited by the
geographic extent of the plaintiff class. This flows from Califano v. Yamasaki, a case
addressing a question about nationwide class actions.209 There the Court observed it is
equity’s rule that injunctive relief should be no more burdensome to the defendant
than necessary to provide complete relief to the plaintiffs.”210 Ultimately, the Court
concluded that nationwide class actions were not “inconsistent with the principles of
equity jurisprudence, since the scope of the injunctive relief is dictated by the extent
of the violation established, not by the geographical extent of the plaintiff class.”211
Similarly, equitable remedies are not constitutionally infirm simply because they
reach nonparties. “Fashioning equitable relief is not and has never been an exercise in
formalistic matching, of formulaically ordering relief scoped precisely to the injury
the plaintiff has asserted and proven.”212 In allowing an equitable remedy affecting
non-parties, the Court has explained that “[c]rafting a preliminary injunction,” or any
other form of equitable relief, “is an exercise of discretion and judgment, often

206 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 1006 n.554 (observing the same).
207 Dep’t of Homeland Sec. v. New York, 140 S. Ct. 599, 600 (2020) (Gorsuch, J., concurring).
208 Id.
209 Califano v. Yamasaki, 442 U.S. 682, 702 (1979).
210 Id.
211 Id.
212 District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 55 (D.D.C. 2020).
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dependent as much on the equities of a given case as the substance of the legal issues
it presents.”213
3.

Tradition Objection

A hybrid challenge, combining the first two described above, posits that
nationwide injunctions are unconstitutional because, pursuant to Grupo Mexicano,
federal courts lack the power to issue remedies that were both unavailable to the
English Chancellor and which lack a connection to traditional federal equity
practice.214 Justice Thomas’ concurrence in Trump v. Hawaii also embraces a version
of this argument. In addition to deeming the nationwide injunction foreign to historic
English practice, Thomas argues that it is alternatively infirm because it is
insufficiently grounded in federal equity practice.215 Because, Thomas urges, the
remedy was first deployed in the 1960s and has only been increasingly issued in the
last few decades, he claims it is insufficiently grounded in federal equity practice.216
The novelty of the nationwide injunction, to Thomas’s eye, evidences its
unconstitutionality.
This “tradition” objection to nationwide injunctions is also infirm. Even if federal
equity should be tempered by traditional practice in the federal courts, the nationwide
injunction still survives. As Justice Scalia explains in Grupo Mexicano, to divine
whether a remedy falls sufficiently within the “traditional” practice of federal courts
one must look at three factors: (a) whether the remedy was unknown to the English
Chancellor of 1789, (b) whether federal and state courts had consistently denied this
kind of relief throughout the twentieth-century, and (c) whether the remedy, if
allowed, would alter the procedural and substantive rights of the parties.217 The
nationwide injunction passes muster. Although nationwide injunctions would be
foreign to the historic English Chancellor, they are neither foreign to American equity
practice nor do they inexorably alter the procedural or substantive rights of the parties.
Nationwide injunctions are not totally foreign to American equity practice. They
are not even particularly new.218 Mila Sohini’s “lost history” of nationwide injunctions
reflects that they have existed for the better part of a century, bringing the remedy well
within the contours of traditional practice as defined in Grupo Mexicano, which
surveyed cases and treatises spanning through the mid twentieth century to ascertain
whether the remedy had ever been issued by federal or state courts.219 Additionally,
the Supreme Court’s treatment of nationwide injunctions to date supports an inference
of the remedy’s constitutionality. The Court encountered nationwide injunctions on

213 Id. (quoting Trump v. Int’l Refugee Assistance Project, 137 S. Ct. 2080, 2087 (2017)).
214 Grupo Mexicano De Desarrollo, S.A. v. All. Bond Fund, Inc., 527 U.S. 308, 318–19 (1999).
215 Trump v. Hawaii, 138 S. Ct. 2392, 2425 (2018).
216 Id. at 2426.
217 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 322–33.
218 See discussion supra Section II.B.
219 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 324–25; Sohoni, supra note 17, at 924.
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several occasions from the 1910s to present and has never intimated that the remedy
violates Article III, giving rise to an inference of the remedy’s constitutionality.220
Even if the nationwide injunction were a truly new remedy, that would not make
it unconstitutional. The Court has, on plenty of occasions, condoned using old
remedies in new ways to respond to urgent problems, as was the case with the antisuit
injunction against enforcement made famous in Ex Parte Young.221 The Court has also
approved totally new kinds of injunctions, such as the anti-labor injunction at the heart
of In re Debs.222 On occasion, the Court has even played a direct role in creating new
remedies, as it did in the mid-twentieth century with the structural injunction. This is
all well within Article III’s tradition limits because equity jurisdiction of the federal
courts has long been understood to extend as far as necessary to give justice to the
parties.223 At bottom, this means that if there is no adequate remedy available at law,
then parties can resort to equity and, guided by equitable principles, courts are
empowered to grant relief.224 Because nationwide injunctions align with this
longstanding principle of American equity, they are sufficiently traditional.
Lastly, nationwide injunctions are constitutional because they do not inexorably
alter the procedural or substantive rights of the parties. As discussed above, the Court
has long condoned broad equitable remedies, including those that reach nonparties,
thus the existence of nationwide injunctions does not inexorably alter the rights of
defendants in nationwide injunction suits. And, the government’s complaint—that
nationwide injunctions uniquely impair their rights since they allow a single federal
court to enjoin it across all jurisdictions—is also infirm. It is the ordinary practice to
enjoin federal agencies from engaging in unlawful conduct in total, not simply as to
individual petitioners.225
C. The Stakes
As the foregoing reflects, the constitutional question is fairly easily answered in
the affirmative—the nationwide injunction is not categorically barred by Article III.
Even though the constitutional question is easily answered, the stakes are exceedingly
high. The difficulty here is with the proxy fight over what that answer means. If the
remedy is permitted, the judiciary signals it is holding ground, continuing to act when
necessary to check executive overreach.

220 Grupo Mexicano, 527 U.S. at 324–25.
221 Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1908).
222 See supra note 167 and accompanying text.
223 See, e.g., Seymour v. Freer, 75 U.S. (8 Wall.) 202, 218 (1869) (“[A] court of equity ha[s]
unquestionable authority to apply its flexible and comprehensive jurisdiction in such manner as
might be necessary to the right administration of justice between the parties.”); see also Hecht
Co. v. Bowles, 321 U.S. 321, 329 (1944) (“Flexibility rather than rigidity has distinguished
[federal equity jurisdiction].”).
224 See, e.g., Watson v. Sutherland, 72 U.S. (5 Wall.) 74, 79 (1867) (district courts properly
exercise their equitable jurisdiction where “the remedy in equity could alone furnish relief, and
. . . the ends of justice require[] the injunction to be issued.”).
225 See discussion supra Section II.C.
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I do not believe that the Trump administration urged the Court to assess the
constitutionality of nationwide injunctions in good faith. The administration hoped
that, with public pressure mounting, the Court would cede the federal courts’ power
to issue the remedy, and with it, the authority to check the executive in and outside of
suits seeking nationwide relief. While power grabs are not totally unexpected, the
prospect of the judiciary acquiescing to the executive’s calls to abdicate its judicial
check endangers the maintenance of our constitutional order.226 The judiciary cannot
serve its constitutional function if it allows the executive to neuter it. Allowing the
political branches the power to categorically strip courts of the power to issue
nationwide injunctions would, as the Supreme Court has warned in other contexts,
“permit a striking anomaly in our tripartite system of government, leading to a regime
in which Congress and the President, not th[e] [c]ourt[s], say ‘what the law is’.”227
The Trump administration’s crusade against nationwide injunctions was an attack on
Article III that the judiciary cannot shy away from.
Given these stakes, the Supreme Court should do something more than simply hold
that nationwide injunctions are constitutional. The Court must do some repair work to
restore the public’s confidence in the judiciary as an institution. As I explore in Part
IV, one means to do this could be to introduce a new kind of abstention calibrated to
prevent abuses of the nationwide injunction.
IV. ABSTENTION PROPOSAL
This Part presents the nationwide injunction abstention proposal. It opens by
setting out key premises undergirding the proposal. From there, it introduces the
abstention proposal, a prudential, discretionary kind of abstention modeled in part off
of Colorado River abstention, consisting of seven disjunctive factors. The factors are
calibrated to deter abusive litigation tactics, prevent untoward interference with nonparty rights and forum-shopping, and should promote horizontal comity between the
district courts as well as percolation of issues. District courts would, under this
proposal, be empowered to dispose of these suits in some instances and in others
simply decline to consider the relief sought. It then proceeds to explain how district
courts should go about balancing the abstention factors. It concludes by analyzing
advantages of using abstention to tame the nationwide injunction and briefly identifies
and responds to likely objections.
A. Premises
At the outset I think it important to identify key premises that undergird my
abstention proposal. At the threshold, I presume that nationwide injunctions are not
always problematic and thus any solution that would categorically bar the remedy is
at best an overcorrection. As discussed at length supra Section II.A, nationwide

226 District of Columbia v. U.S. Dep’t of Agric., 444 F. Supp. 3d 1, 53 (D.D.C. 2020) (“Any
recent chaos stemming from nationwide injunctions is the product of an executive branch
aggressive in pursuit of appeals and in advancing its present arguments in derogation of judicial
power. Perhaps that sort of power grab is to be expected from the executive branch. What is
unexpected, and dangerous to the maintenance of our constitutional order, is that instead of
fighting back, some courts have rolled over.”).
227 Boumediene v. Bush, 553 U.S. 723, 765 (2008) (quoting Marbury v. Madison, 5 U.S. (1
Cranch) 137, 177 (1803)).
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injunctions have existed in one form or another for more than a century in both public
and private law contexts. While the frequency with which district courts issue these
injunctions has increased overtime, the remedy itself has not proved to be
inappropriate in all contexts. I took this to heart when trying to devise a solution to
outlier situations where some kind of course correction is necessary. Rather than
categorically bar the remedy, it seemed to me that we needed a solution that permits
nationwide injunctions to be issued.
A related premise is that the lower federal courts have the institutional competency
and incentive to self-police against many of the problems nationwide injunctions can
sow. By this I mean that federal judges are capable of spotting potential abuses in their
midst early on in some of the most problematic nationwide injunction suits. While
there will perhaps be some judges who relish opportunities to overreach, they are
outliers. This is key because it opens up the possibility that we might guard against
many nationwide injunction abuses by simply giving our federal judges tools to flush
out abuses at early stages in the litigation.
Another premise is that just as nationwide injunctions are not a new remedy, the
solution itself need not be new—old tools likely can help. Much of the discourse about
nationwide injunctions has assumed that the novelty of the remedy is a large part of
why the courts have struggled to tame it. That is, they think the system is flummoxed
by nationwide injunctions because the courts simply lack the necessary tools to
accommodate the remedy in a system not designed for it. I do not think that is quite
right. Nationwide injunctions have existed for the better part of a century and have
only put serious pressure on the courts in the last decade or so. Moreover, the problems
nationwide injunctions currently present are quite similar to ones that have arisen
throughout the history of federal equity practice. For instance, the prospect of
conflicting remedies arising in the context of concurrent jurisdiction is nothing new—
federal courts have long dealt with that by invoking abstention.
An additional consideration is that the proposed remedy should not favor any
particular party.228 I think this point is particularly important for two reasons. First, it
is a bedrock principle that equity be equally accessible to all who invoke it.229 While
my proposal aims to temper access to nationwide injunctions, I think it wrongheaded
to single out any party for special treatment or disability. Doing otherwise would be
incongruous with hundreds of years of equity jurisprudence.230 Second, as Justice
Sotomayor231 and Stephen Vladeck232 have argued, the Supreme Court has up to this
228 See, e.g., Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 807 (1870) (federal courts must
rely on their “flexible jurisdiction in equity . . . to protect all rights and do justice to all
concerned.”).
229 See, e.g., Green v. Biddle, 21 U.S. (8 Wheat.) 1, 26 (1823) (“It is not only a maxim of the
Court of Chancery, but of every wise legislator, that equality is equity.”).
230 See, e.g., Brown-Crummer Inv. Co. v. City of Purcell, 128 F.2d 400, 404 (10th Cir. 1942)
(“A court of equity is a forum of conscience. It acts when and as conscience commands. It exacts
of those coming within its portals and applying for relief that they come with clean hands and
right conduct.”).
231 Wolf v. Cook Cnty., 140 S. Ct. 681, 684 (2020).
232 Vladeck, supra note 120, at 155 (“[T]he true justification for emergency or extraordinary
relief there is not that the lower courts have unduly hamstrung the executive branch from the
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point inordinately privileged the federal government’s position in nationwide
injunction suits. This is normatively problematic. But, more urgently still, it too often
leads to the very abuses of process that opponents of nationwide injunctions decry in
the first instance. For those reasons, my proposal puts the federal government on equal
footing with other parties.
Another premise is more practical—the solution should facilitate information
gathering from the district court and reviewing court. As discussed supra Section II.B,
one of the key problems sown by nationwide injunctions is that they shoot up
important legal questions too quickly to the courts of appeals and the Supreme Court,
depriving both of varied, well-reasoned opinions exploring the metes and bounds of
the legal issue and public interests at stake. Nationwide injunction suits too often
position individual district court judges as if they are a Supreme Court of one deciding
important issues for the whole nation with little briefing and little input from
stakeholders. One means of correcting against that is to require district courts to gather
information about the legal landscape in the first instance—for example, identifying
other similar suits, taking into account nonparties who will be impacted if jurisdiction
is exercised, and being in active dialogue with co-equal courts wrestling with the same
or similar issues, among other things.
Additionally, I believe that the solution should ultimately afford district courts
some flexibility. Equity should not be so rigid as to be unable to meet novel problems
head-on.233 District courts need to be able to pivot to address unique situations that
bright-line rules might otherwise miss. At bottom, our solution should permit district
courts to be responsive to evolving conditions, urgent needs, and new kinds of injuries.
Lastly, the formalist fix—freezing our equity in time—is no fix at all. It elevates
predictability above justice, is legally conservative, and otherwise antithetical to
equity. 234 We can begin by telling the truth about what work history is and is not doing
here. We can tell a different history of federal equity and, in doing so, accommodate
our current concerns about its scope and our chancellors’ discretion.235 Where new
remedies emerge, legitimacy can be earned by consent. The constitutional legitimacy
of a class of equitable remedy does not necessarily turn on its lineage. If legitimacy is
the true concern, trying to divine hard, ahistoric limits is the wrong approach.
beginning; it’s that the government has seen the error of its ways, and should be let off the hook
for its original sin.”).
233 See Malveaux, supra note 16, at 56 (“Although national injunctions are imperfect and crude
forms of justice, they are better than no justice at all—which for some actions, may be the
alternative.”).
234 Randolph Haines, The Conservative Assault on Federal Equity, 88 AM. BANKR. L.J. 451,
479–85 (2014).
235 Cf. Burbank, supra note 201, at 1346 (“In meeting the challenge of progress in a world that
is in every respect more accessible than before, we cannot allow our traditions to hold us
hostage. Neither can we afford to neglect them. Honoring our legal traditions sometimes
requires a change in the rules to reflect the changed circumstances in which they operate.
Honoring any legal tradition requires that claims of changed circumstances be filtered through
an understanding of the reasons for the rules tradition bequeaths, both those that are formal and,
to the extent implicated, those that reflect the social context in which the rules were born or
nourished. It also requires that attention be given, in both dimensions, to traditional rules about
who should decide.”).
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B. The Proposal
Given the aforementioned premises, it seems to me that the best solution is to turn
to abstention. I submit that a prudential, discretionary kind of abstention, that can be
invoked sua sponte or on the motion of any party or intervening movant with a real
interest in the suit at any point after a complaint seeking a nationwide injunction is
filed. Ideally, abstention will be considered before or shortly after a party moves for
a preliminary or permanent nationwide injunction.
The abstention power is a narrow but important exception to the general rule that
federal courts have a “virtually unflagging obligation . . . to exercise the jurisdiction
given them.”236 The contours of the abstention power are well illuminated in
Quackenbush v. Allstate Insurance, where the Court explains the “authority of a
federal court to abstain from exercising its jurisdiction extends to all cases in which
the court has discretion to grant or deny relief,” clarifying that the “power to abstain”
is located “in the historic discretion exercised by federal courts sitting in equity” but
is not a “technical rule of equity procedure.”237
Presently, the Supreme Court recognizes five discrete kinds of abstention in equity
matters.238 Pullman abstention permits a federal court to stay a plaintiff’s claim that a
state law violates the Constitution until the state’s judiciary has had an opportunity to
apply the law to the plaintiff’s particular case.239 Younger abstention bars federal
courts from hearing civil rights tort claims brought by a person currently being
prosecuted for a matter arising from that claim in state court.240 Buford abstention
allows a federal court sitting in diversity to abstain from exercising jurisdiction where
state courts are likely to have greater expertise in a particularly complex area of state
law.241 Thibodaux abstention allows a federal court sitting in diversity to allow a state
to decide issues of state law that are of great public importance to the state where the
federal court finds that exercising jurisdiction would infringe on state sovereignty.242
And Colorado River abstention allows a federal court to abstain where there are
236 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817–18 (1976) (first
citing England v. La. State Bd. of Med. Exam’rs, 375 U.S. 411, 415 (1964); then citing
McClellan v. Carland, 217 U.S. 268, 281 (1910); and then citing Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6
Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821)).
237 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996).
238 Five is an oversimplification. Maggie Gardner and others make a convincing case that the
Court has approved of other kinds of abstention that are unique but are poorly defined. See, e.g.,
Maggie Gardner, Abstention at the Boarder, 105 VA. L. REV. 63 (2019) (critiquing international
comity abstention).
239 R.R. Comm’n v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 501 (1941).
240 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971). Though beyond the scope of my Article, I think it
important to point out Fred O. Smith, Jr.’s inspired and timely article urging that the Supreme
Court recognize an exception to Younger abstention when litigants challenge structural or
systemic constitutional violations. Fred O. Smith, Jr., Abstention in the Time of Ferguson, 131
HARV. L. REV. 2284 (2018).
241 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 339 (1943).
242 La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25 (1959).
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parallel litigations in state and federal courts being carried out to determine the rights
of parties with respect to the same issues of law.243
My proposal is modeled in part off of Colorado River abstention. It is a prudential
and discretionary doctrine. But there are some differences. One key difference is the
abstention factors. The Colorado River factors are calibrated to inoculate against the
problems raised by parallel litigations in state and federal courts carried out to
determine the rights of parties with respect to the same issues of law.244 Courts weigh
different factors, including but not limited to: the order in which the courts assumed
jurisdiction over the property or parties;245 relative inconvenience of the fora;246
relative progress of the two actions;247 desire to avoid piecemeal litigation;248 whether
federal law provides the rule of decision;249 whether the state court will adequately
243 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976).
244 See, e.g., R.R. St. & Co. v. Transp. Ins. Co., 656 F.3d 966, 978 (9th Cir. 2011).
245 See, e.g., Black Sea Inv., Ltd. v. United Heritage Corp., 204 F.3d 647, 650 (5th Cir. 2000).
246 Ambrosia Coal & Constr. Co. v. Morales, 368 F.3d 1320, 1332 (11th Cir. 2004)
(characterizing factor as focusing “primarily on the physical proximity of the federal forum to
the evidence and witnesses”); see also Jackson-Platts v. Gen. Elec. Cap. Corp., 727 F.3d 1127,
1141 (11th Cir. 2013) (where federal forum and state forum are “equally convenient,” this factor
cuts against abstention); Niagara Mohawk Power Corp. v. Hudson River-Black River Regul.
Dist., 673 F.3d 84, 101 (2d Cir. 2012) (similar); Stewart v. W. Heritage Ins., 438 F.3d 488, 492
(5th Cir. 2006) (similar); PainWebber, Inc. v. Cohen, 276 F.3d 197, 207 (6th Cir. 2001)
(similar).
247 See, e.g., Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 21 (1983)
(“[P]riority should not be measured exclusively by which complaint was filed first, but rather
in terms of how much progress has been made in the two actions.”); Transouth Fin. Corp. v.
Bell, 149 F.3d 1292, 1295 (11th Cir. 1998) (“[T]his factor requires the court to consider not
only the chronological order in which the parties initiated the concurrent proceedings, but the
progress of the proceedings and whether the party availing itself of the federal forum should
have acted earlier . . . .”).
248 See, e.g., Ryan v. Johnson, 115 F.3d 193, 198 (3d Cir. 1997) (“mere possibility of piecemeal
litigation” does not justify Colorado River abstention; rather, there must be a strongly
articulated congressional policy against piecemeal litigation in the specific context of the case
under review”); Burns v. Walter, 931 F.2d 140, 146 (1st Cir. 1991) (concern for avoiding
piecemeal adjudication is met only where it “gives rise to special complications” not present in
straightforward state law negligence case). But see Liberty Mut. Ins. Co. v. ForemostMcKesson, Inc., 751 F.2d 475, 477 (1st Cir. 1985) (affirming stay of federal action under
Colorado River, in favor of state court action, to avoid piecemeal litigation and the possibility
of divergent interpretations of insurance policy language, and where state court action was filed
first and involved all insurers as parties).
249 See, e.g., Evanston Ins. Co. v. Jimco, Inc., 844 F.2d 1185, 1193 (5th Cir. 1988) (“The
presence of a federal law issue ‘must always be a major consideration weighing against
surrender [of jurisdiction],’ but the presence of state law issues weighs in favor of surrender
only in rare circumstances.”) (quoting Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 26); Village of
Westfield v. Welch’s, 170 F.3d 116, 124 (2d Cir. 1999) (“[W]hen the applicable substantive
law is federal, abstention is disfavored.”); Noonan S., Inc. v. Cnty. of Volusia, 841 F.2d 380,
383 (11th Cir. 1988) (“[F]act that both forums are adequate to protect the parties’ rights merely
renders this factor neutral.”); Woodford v. Cmty. Action Agency of Greene Cnty., Inc., 239
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protect the rights of all parties;250 and whether the federal filing was vexatious
(intended to harass the other party) or reactive (in response to adverse rulings in the
state court).251 Of course, nationwide injunctions raise similar but slightly different
problems than those at issue in Colorado River abstention cases. For that reason, infra
Section IV.C, I suggest seven disjunctive factors, several informed by the Colorado
River factors, others unique to the nationwide injunction context.
Another key difference is how courts should go about balancing the abstention
factors. In Colorado River abstention, the factors must be heavily weighed in favor of
the exercise of jurisdiction.252 The metrics used in Colorado River abstention are
informed by two overarching interests: the rationalization that it makes little sense for
two courts to expend the time and effort to achieve a resolution to a common
question253 and sense that abstention is an appropriate means to promote regard for
proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations.254 Because
different interests inform my nationwide injunction abstention proposal, I suggest a
different approach towards balancing infra Part IV.D.
C. Factors
Before discussing the factors individually, I will explain how the factors relate to
one another and how district courts could go about gathering the information necessary
to apply the factors.
Under the proposal, the first four factors—whether nationwide injunctions have
issued in similar cases (factor 1), whether there is a circuit split on a common core
issue of law (factor 2), the representativeness of the parties (factor 3), whether there
are suits involving at least two common parties and one common core issue of law
(factor 4)—should always be considered by the district court. These factors are
calibrated to guard against suppressing percolation of legal issues, guard against

F.3d 517, 525 (2d Cir. 2001) (“Nor may abstention be based simply on an aversion to deciding
an issue prior to a state court’s adjudication.”).
250 See, e.g., Niagara Mohawk, 673 F.3d at 103.
251 See, e.g., Calvert Fire Ins. Co. v. Am. Mut. Reins. Co., 600 F.2d 1228, 1234 (7th Cir. 1979)
(finding interest in preventing vexatiousness clearly justifies federal deferral to a parallel state
proceeding unless there exists strong countervailing reasons for the federal court to decide the
federal suit without further delay), noted with approval in Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 17
n.20 (“[T]he vexatious or reactive nature of either the federal or the state litigation may
influence the decision whether to defer to a parallel state litigation under Colorado River . . .
.”).
252 See Cone Mem’l Hosp., 460 U.S. at 16.
253 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (noting
that “[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of the litigation” favors abstention (citations omitted)).
254 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 725 (1996) (alternatively characterizing
abstention in Colorado River as being justified on premise that ‘exercise of federal review of
the question in a case and in similar cases would be disruptive of state efforts to establish a
coherent policy with respect to a matter of substantial public concern’ (quoting Colo. River, 424
U.S. at 814–16)).
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forum- and judge-shopping, and encourage horizontal comity between co-equal
district courts with concomitant jurisdiction over similar cases.
The remaining factors—whether the other suits were earlier filed (factor 5), the
relative progress of the suits (factor 6), and whether the instant suit was reactively filed
in response to adverse rulings in other suits (factor 7)—are only pertinent where the
district court has found there are similar suits pursuant to the fourth factor. Factors
five through seven are calibrated to promote comity between co-equal district courts
with concomitant jurisdiction over the same or similar suits and guard against forumand judge-shopping. They operate sort of like the first-filed rule, modified for the
nationwide injunction context. To refresh, the first-filed rule is a judicial doctrine
developed to address the problem of duplicative federal litigation. Under the rule,
where there are successively filed federal suits in different district courts with
concurrent jurisdiction, the court which has first possession of the subject must
typically decide it.255 Courts generally apply the first-filed rule after evaluating three
factors: (a) the chronology of events, (b) the similarity of the parties, and (c) the
similarity of the issues or claims at stake.256 My proposal modifies the traditional firstfiled factors in a few important ways. For instance, while the fourth factor focuses on
the commonality of parties, it does not require that all parties are similar—instead, it
directs the district court to assess whether there are two common parties and at least
one common core issue of law.257 This looser standard is a better fit for the nationwide
injunction context given how the most problematic of these cases tend to be litigated—
large consortiums of states suing several federal actors and agencies simultaneously
in different district courts.
Insofar as factors five through seven are concerned, district courts will need to do
considerable information gathering to get a grasp of the universe of potentially same
or similar suits.258 This can likely be achieved in a few ways. One approach could be
to direct the parties to the instant suit to disclose to the court all suits it is currently
engaged in in federal court with the opposing parties and to make a representation to
the court as to whether those suits involve at least one overlapping core common legal
issue. These disclosures would include the case name, case number, date filed, short
statement identifying the core legal issues of that case, and a brief description of the

255 EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1988).
256 Alltrade, Inc. v. Uniweld Prods., Inc., 946 F.2d 622, 625 (9th Cir. 1991).
257 The Sixth Circuit has adopted a similar approach in other contexts. See Certified Restoration
Dry Cleaning Network, LLC v. Tenke Corp., 511 F.3d 535, 551 (6th Cir. 2007) (holding the
first-filed rule can be applied “when actions involving nearly identical parties and issues have
been filed in two different district courts”).
258 Amanda Frost has similarly suggested that district courts undertake significant information
gathering before they issue a nationwide injunction. See Frost, supra note 1, at 1116 (“The best
practice is for a federal district court to establish procedures to ensure that it has all the relevant
information about the costs and benefits of the proposed scope of an injunction before issuing
it. The court should hold a hearing at which the parties to the litigation, as well as interested
third parties, can present evidence and make arguments about the proper scope of the remedy.
The court should then issue a written ruling addressing the costs and benefits of an injunction
in the case at hand that will provide a guide to the appellate courts, which may be asked to
review the scope of the injunctive relief.” (citations omitted)).
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current status of the case. This approach would require some labor on the part of the
parties but is justified because they are in the best position to advise the district court
of the universe of disputes. District courts would be free to scrutinize these disclosures
and need not defer to parties’ representations that other cases are or are not dissimilar.
With this foundation, we will explore each of the factors in further depth.
1.

Have Nationwide Injunctions Issued in Similar Cases

This factor is calibrated to guard against the risk that a nationwide injunction will
depress percolation of legal issues and otherwise encourages horizontal comity
between co-equal district courts with concomitant jurisdiction over similar cases. For
the purposes of this factor, a case is similar if there is at least one common core legal
issue and it is more likely than not that if all the courts hearing similar cases were to
grant the relief requested that the remedies would conflict. In most cases, this factor
will lend some weight to support abstention.
Ensuring that important legal issues can percolate in the lower courts is vitally
important, as discussed supra Section II.C. Among other things, district courts
reviewing this factor should take into account whether the common core issue of law
is a matter of first impression in its own circuit and whether there is no circuit split on
a core issue of law underlying the request for injunction. If the answer to either of
those questions is yes, this is good evidence that the legal issue has not yet percolated,
making it more likely than not that if an injunction is granted and later appealed that
the reviewing court will have few if any other cases to draw upon to resolve the issue.
Where there is an immediate need for a ruling on a novel issue of law, this may warrant
exercising jurisdiction. However, less emergent disputes may partially support the
decision to abstain.
It is also imperative that we encourage comity between federal courts of equal
rank.259 District courts are in a great position to do just that. Among other things,
district courts reviewing this factor should assess whether sister districts have issued
or declined nationwide injunctions in similar suits. Subsequent courts need not totally
defer to the decisions of their co-equal sisters. However, they should assess whether
“[w]ise judicial administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and
comprehensive disposition of the litigation”260 favors abstention.
This factor sometimes cuts the other way. For instance, if the same issues have
been substantially litigated in other circuits then there is less worry that issuing a
nationwide injunction will depress percolation. This is what happened in Pennsylvania
v. President United States.261 There, the Department of Justice argued that a
nationwide injunction should not have issued because it would depress percolation of
the issue in other courts.262 The Third Circuit found that argument unavailing because

259 Cf. Zide Sport Shop of Ohio v. Ed Tobergate Assocs., Inc., 16 Fed. App’x 433, 437 (6th
Cir. 2007).
260 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (quoting
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 324 U.S. 180, 183 (1952)).
261 Pennsylvania v. President U.S., 930 F.3d 543 (3d Cir. 2019).
262 Id. at 576 n.34.
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it identified several other cases where courts had considered “substantially the same
legal issues as we confront here,” which it deemed as clear evidence of percolation.263
2.

Circuit Split over a Core Issue of Law

This factor is calibrated to help guard against forum-shopping and also encourages
horizontal comity between circuit courts with concomitant jurisdiction over cases with
at least one common core legal issue.
Critics of nationwide injunctions are legitimately worried that litigants will
strategically file suit so as to secure a court or even a judge that will favor its legal
position, as discussed supra Section II.C. The crux of the worry is that litigants will
shop their case to the circuit that already has or is most likely to be convinced to rule
on a core legal issue in the movant’s favor. This factor directs district courts gather
information that may point to the fact that the case was forum- or even judge-shopped.
This helps in two ways—it may lend considerable weight in favor of the district court
abstaining or, in the event it does not abstain, the district court’s analysis can help the
reviewing court assess the propriety of the district court’s decision to not abstain in
light of the information the district court had at its disposal at the time of its decision.
This factor also helps encourage comity among co-equal circuit courts. It does this
in two ways. It flushes out forum-shopping, incentivizing litigants to not strategically
deprive the appropriate fora of the case. And if the case is heard, it creates a record
that can help the reviewing circuit take into account its sisters’ views on the common
core legal issue. This is important because it affords an opportunity for conversation
among the circuits. While district courts are bound by the law of their circuit, circuit
courts may accommodate the views of its sisters on important legal issues.264
3.

Representativeness of Named Parties

This factor is calibrated to guard against courts exercising jurisdiction over
nationwide injunction suits that would inequitably infringe on the rights of nonparties.
In that vein, it directs district courts to take into account the representativeness of the
parities to the suit and, in certain circumstances, this may weigh heavily in favor of
abstention. On the back end, it may help protect non-party interests by encouraging
district courts to play a more proactive role in resolving representativeness problems.
Given the breadth of nationwide injunctions, they all too often affect the rights of
nonparties to the suit. This is not always problematic. For instance, sometimes
nationwide injunctions are the best means to go about quickly protecting the rights of
a diffusely constituted marginalized group, such as a subclass of immigrants scattered
throughout the country.265 In cases like that, the universe of nonparties inevitably

263 Id.
264 For a superb discussion of this approach, see Wyatt G. Sassman, How Circuits Can Fix
Their Splits, 103 MARQ. L. REV. 1401 (2020).
265 I suggest accommodation, not total deference. See Mast, Foos & Co. v. Stover Mfg. Co.,
177 U.S. 485, 488–89 (1900) (observing that “[c]omity is not a rule of law, but one of practice,
convenience and expediency . . . the primary duty of every court is to dispose of cases according
to the law and the facts; in a word, to decide them right.” Deference comes into play only where
“there may be a doubt as to the soundness” of the judge’s views such that “a uniformity of a
ruling to avoid confusion” is preferred “until a higher court has settled the law.”).
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supports the relief sought because most could not bring suit themselves. In such a
situation, representativeness—the fact that those nonparties’ interests are adequately
represented by the parties themselves—is sufficient to sustain the breadth of the
remedy and thus would not tilt in favor of abstention.
However, in other cases the lack of representativeness harms nonparties. Too
often, defenders of nationwide injunctions fail to account for how the
unrepresentativeness of parties seeking nationwide injunction skews how the remedy
is shaped, obfuscating the unique injuries of those affected by the injunction. There’s
a special value in people who actually suffer an injury being able to have their day in
court.266 Some defenders of the nationwide injunction urge that this is a de minimus
problem. For instance, while Amanda Frost recognizes that “in some cases nonparties
will not be able to bring their competing claims to court as a practical matter,” she
suggests that any harm to nonparties is minimal because “nonparties can participate
as amici in ongoing litigation, and their position may also be represented by
government attorneys defending the law being enjoined.”267 But Frost misses the point
that attorney general suits often fail to capture the true interests of real parties and
amicus participation is woefully insufficient.
It is true that states’ public law litigation, in particular where it challenges federal
overstepping, plays an important role in the “ongoing debate over the proper scope
and contours of federal and public law litigation.”268 However, the main reason why
states bring so many suits is because they have an advantage proving their standing.269

266 See generally Nina A. Mendelson, Tribes, Cities, and Children: Emerging Voices in
Environmental Litigation, 34 J. LAND USE & ENV’T L. 237 (2019) (discussing value of tribes,
cities, and youth in taking environmental claims to court; people who directly suffer the injury
should be able to have day in court, might not have other options to address threats, their views
might not be represented by state and federal government actors, etc.); Alexandra D. Lahav,
The Political Justification for Group Litigation, 81 FORDHAM L. REV. 3193 (2013) (arguing
litigation can promote desirable ends such as citizen empowerment and deliberation; also
arguing group litigation can provide a safety valve for the executive and legislature).
267 Frost, supra note 1, at 1110.
268 Raymond H. Brescia, On Objects and Sovereigns: The Emerging Frontiers of State
Standing, 96 OR. L. REV. 363, 435 (2018).
269 The standing doctrine revolution has seriously limited the ability of private citizens to bring
public law litigation. Prior to the 1970s, the Supreme Court’s standing analysis was typified by
“flexible and decidedly sub-constitutional standards.” Myriam E. Gilles, Representational
Standing: U.S. ex rel. Stevens and the Future of Public Law Litigation, 89 CALIF. L. REV. 315,
318 (2001). But see Ann Woolhandler & Caleb Nelson, Does History Defeat Standing
Doctrine?, 102 MICH. L. REV. 689 (2004) (arguing that federal courts have long sought to
maintain distinctions between proper litigants of public and private rights). From the 1970s
onward, the Court has grounded standing rules in Article III of the Constitution, promulgating
rules and multi-pronged tests designed to evaluate plaintiffs’ standing to sue in light of
separation of powers interests supposedly embodied in Article III’s “case or controversy”
requirement. Gilles, supra, at 317. But see Heather Elliott, The Functions of Standing, 61 STAN.
L. REV. 459 (2008) (arguing contemporary standing doctrine does poor job of redressing
separation of powers problems Court claims justify doctrine).
But states have fared better. There are two reasons for this. First, the Supreme Court holds
states to a different standard than private citizens in public law litigation. In Massachusetts v.
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The states have no particular acumen in forefronting the interests of interested
nonparties. In fact, the states’ suits have a tendency of obscuring the landscape of
interests at stake and elevating interests that should not be prioritized by the courts.
As Raymond Brescia explains in the context of the Muslim Travel Ban litigations:
The stories that states tell are very different from those of individual plaintiffs.
Compare the alleged injuries of the states of Hawai’i, Washington, Minnesota, i.e.,
that their universities’ students will not be able to travel and their universities’
educational mission will be harmed, to those of an individual stopped at a U.S. airport
who risked his life serving as an interpreter in Iraq for U.S. ground troops. Which is
more salient, which calls out for judicial intervention, and which places the alleged
illegal activity in higher relief?270
Thus, though states are getting past standing hurdles in nationwide injunction suits,
they are not bringing vehicles that speak to the broad range of interests at stake.
Relegating impacted nonparties to amicus status is a similarly dubious suggestion.
There are three key reasons why amicus status is a woefully insufficient means to
protect and preserve third party interests in nationwide injunction cases. First and
foremost, where a third party finds herself at risk of being bound by a nationwide
injunction but not a party to the suit, amicus curiae status alone is not enough to allow
her to preserve her interests. The reason for this is somewhat obvious—amicus
participation is by design quite limited. American federal courts have historically been
hostile towards third party participation in litigation.271 Amicus practice, as we
received and refined it from the English tradition,272 is no replacement for full party
participation and was never intended to be one. Rather, amici may appear and
participate in proceedings only by negotiation with the core parties and are often
further limited by the court. While such limits are sensible where third parties are

EPA, the Court famously instructed that states be afforded “special solicitude” in standing
inquiries. Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520 (2007). That special status has been invoked
by lower federal courts repeatedly as justifying less-than searching standing inquiries where
states sue the federal government. Second, states have shifted their strategy in public law
litigation to get around barriers to standing, increasingly deploying a private law model of
litigation to advance public law interests.
270 Brescia, supra note 268, at 435.
271 Samuel Krislov, The Amicus Curiae Brief: From Friendship to Advocacy, 72 YALE L.J. 694
(1963) (describing evolution under American law).
272 See, e.g., Michael K. Lowman, The Litigating Amicus Curiae: When Does the Party Begin
After the Friends Leave?, 41 AM. U. L. REV. 1244 (1992) (tracing origins of amicus curiae
practice to 14th century and Roman law; traditionally, amicus curiae was not a party to the
litigation, but served as an impartial assistant to the judiciary, providing advice and information
to a mistake or doubtful court); Stuart Banner, The Myth of the Neutral Amicus: American
Courts and Their Friends, 1790–1890, 20 CONST. COMMENT. 111, 122 (2003) (arguing study
of early amici participants reveals that transitioned from historic mix of neutral and partisanship
in roughly equal measure to mixture dominated by partisanship; change that was “most likely
driven by changing nature of litigation rather than by any change in partisanship of lawyers
themselves”); Dan Scweitzer, The Modern History of State Attorneys Arguing as Amici Curiae
in the U.S. Supreme Court, 22 GREEN BAG 143 (2019) (describing evolution of state amici curiae
practice).
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disinterested expert observers or advocates of causes,273 they make no sense where a
third party’s own rights are at stake. Second, amicus status may not even be a practical
avenue for a wide array of third parties with stakes in the outcome of a case. The
average person can no longer serve as an amicus. The amici bar is almost entirely
made up of monied organizations, advocates, and wealthy private actors who can
afford to fund briefs, lawyers, and trade in influence and prestige. Third, even if a third
party harnesses the resources to appear as an amicus, the extent of her participation
will be limited. Whether, when, and to what extent amici participate in proceedings is
negotiated between the core courts and amici and ultimately subject to curtailment by
the court. Moreover, even if a third party can appear, she will likely be drowned out
by non-profits and others who control the field.274
Given the foregoing, under this factor, district courts should assess whether the
parties sufficiently represent the universe of important interests at stake. This can be
done by searchingly assessing whether the named parties’ interests are representative
of the universe of interests that will be affected by the nationwide injunction sought.
That search should keep in mind that, more often than not, nonparties’ interests are
not only unrepresented by the parties but also not effectively or (sometimes, at all)
raised by amici.275 The analysis should be informed by traditional equitable regard for
the rights of nonparties. In that vein, district courts should take care to ensure that,
where possible, they not only take jurisdiction in cases where it is more likely than not
that the disposition will negatively impinge the rights of nonparties.276 Where the
movant claims she is seeking to vindicate the rights of a large but poorly defined group
of persons, this may weigh in favor of abstention if the court cannot reasonably discern
a common set of facts shared by the group that justifies the ultimate relief sought.277

273 See Ruben J. Garcia, A Democratic Theory of Amicus Advocacy, 35 FL. STATE U. L. REV.
315 (2008) (arguing amicus briefs are an important part of deliberative democracy, a theory that
favors fully informed debate as a condition to a democratic society); Paul M. Collins, Jr. et al.,
Me Too? An Investigation of Repetition in U.S. Supreme Court Amicus Curiae Briefs, 97
JUDICATURE 228, 228–29 (2014) (observing that literature reflects that amicus briefs influence
judicial behavior; at Supreme Court briefs affect certiorari decisions, litigation success,
ideological direction of the Court’s decisions and justices’ votes, frequency of separate opinion
writing, and content of the Court’s opinions).
274 Michael J. Harris, Amicus Curiae: Friend or Foe? The Limits of Friendship in American
Jurisprudence, 5 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. ADVOC. 1 (2000) (arguing private party amicus
curiae are inappropriate because they are inconsistent with established legal doctrine— they
neither further policy goals nor a philanthropic agenda).
275 See discussion supra Part II.
276 Cf. Joy v. Wirtz, 13 F. Cas. 1172, 1174 (C.C.D. Pa. 1806) (explaining that courts should
“take care to make no decree” that would affect the rights of nonparties).
277 Cf. Scott v. Donald, 165 U.S. 107, 115 (1897) (“The theory of the decree is that the plaintiff
is one of a class of persons whose rights are infringed and threatened, and that he so represents
such class that he may pray an injunction on behalf of all persons that constitute it. It is, indeed,
possible that there may be others in like case with the plaintiff, and that such persons may be
numerous, but such a state of facts is too conjectural to furnish a safe basis upon which a court
of equity ought to grant an injunction.”).
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It is possible that district courts might also use this factor to play a more proactive
role in guiding nationwide injunction suits. For instance, if a suit has a clear
representativeness problem, but equities otherwise weigh in favor of it proceeding, the
district court would be justified in taking affirmative steps to help cure the
representativeness problem.278 Judges could, after making a finding of deficient
representativeness, put out a notice to those whose rights are at stake and create a
“contest to the fullness and adequacy of the representation” or simply invite litigating
amicus to the suit.279 Expanding the “who” of the litigation in this way may very well
help quell concerns about the legitimacy of a very broad injunction.280
4.

Commonality of Parties to Earlier Filed, Live Suits

This factor directs the district court to assess whether the case before it is the same
or similar to other cases currently being litigated before co-equal district courts. For
the purposes of this factor, a case is the same or similar where there are at least two
common parties, at least one common core legal issue, and it is more likely than not
that if all the courts hearing similar cases were to grant the relief requested that the
remedies would conflict.
This factor is related to the first factor insofar as both direct the district court to
take into account similar cases being heard by co-equal district courts. However,
factors one and four pick up on different kinds of comity problems. The first factor
targets what might be termed as moderate comity problems—cases that raise the same
legal issue and that, down the line, might lead to conflicts between the courts. The
fourth factor targets a more pernicious problem—cases where a common set of parties
attempts to litigate the same common core legal issue in two or more courts
simultaneously.
In the event that there are other suits involving some subset of the same parties and
a common core legal issue, the district court should move on and assess the fifth factor,
and so on. If the district court determines that there are no similar suits, it technically
need not assess factors five, six, or seven, all of which are calibrated to assess potential
problems that erupt where there are similar cases.
5.

Order in Which Jurisdiction Was Assumed over the Parties

This factor directs the district court to take account of the order in which the same
or similar suits, as found in factor four, were filed in other co-equal district courts. A
finding that there are one or more earlier filed same or similar suits may weigh heavily
in favor of abstention. There are a few reasons for this. First, it is well-settled that
district courts lack the authority to hear later filed suits that seek to preempt
substantially developed merits litigations in other federal fora let alone grant the relief

278 Fiss, supra note 199, at 26 (suggesting the same in the context of structural injunctions).
279 Id.
280 Howard M. Wasserman, “Nationwide” Injunctions Are Really “Universal” Injunctions and
They Are Never Appropriate, 22 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 335, 366 (2018) (arguing that the
scope of injunction is permissibly broadened by expanding the scope of the litigation itself—
one way to do this is to allow greater third-party participation—class actions, associational
standing, third-party standing, etc.).
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sought therein.281 Second, where possible, district courts should take reasonable steps
to avoid the multiplicity and circuity of actions.282 Third, and relatedly, district courts
should not countenance litigants’ attempts to use nationwide injunction suits as an
instrument of procedural fencing either to secure delay or choose a forum.283
6.

Relative Progress of the Suits

This factor directs district courts to assess whether exercising jurisdiction would
needlessly encroach on the jurisdiction of sister courts. It ostensibly directs district
courts to employ a kind of preclusion-light to avoid comity problems. Under this
factor, district courts should searchingly assess the status of the same or similar cases
uncovered in factor four. Among other things, the court should take account of
whether there are motions pending or rulings of law on common core legal issues.
Where there are motions pending on common core legal issues before a sister
court, this may weigh in favor of abstention in light of the interest in encouraging
sound judicial administration and comity among federal courts.284 If there is
sufficiently mature motion practice before a sister court, even if still pending,
abstention may be appropriate. Different interests are at play here, including
preservation of judicial resources, respect for other courts’ decisions about how best
to structure their proceedings, and avoiding waste of party resources.
If there are rulings of law on common core legal issues, this should weigh in favor
of abstention. There are a few reasons for this, very similar to those supporting
application of res judicata and claim preclusion.285 Among others, society has an

281 See, e.g., Gregory-Portland Indep. Sch. Dist. v. Tex. Educ. Agency, 576 F.2d 81, 82–83
(5th Cir. 1978) (directing second district court to transfer case back to first district court which
still had jurisdiction over the parties); W. Gulf Mar. Ass’n v. ILA Deep Sea Loc. 24, 751 F.2d
721, 731 (5th Cir. 1985) (holding that the second district court’s issuance of preliminary
injunction in a purported effort to “preserve the status quo” intruded on the decisional authority
of the first district court which still had jurisdiction over the parties); see also Ceres Gulf v.
Cooper, 957 F.2d 1199 (5th Cir. 1992) (reversing district court’s denial of intervention motion
and directing the court to dismiss for lack of jurisdiction).
282 Cf. Smith v. Transit Cas. Co., 281 F. Supp. 661, 670 (E.D. Tex. 1968), aff’d, 410 F.2d 210
(5th Cir. 1969) (noting import of avoiding “multiplicity and circuity of actions” in declaratory
judgment context).
283 Cf. Mission Ins. v. Puritan Fashions, 706 F.2d 599, 602 n.3 (5th Cir. 1983) (noting that the
“wholesome purposes of declaratory acts would be aborted by its use as an instrument of
procedural fencing either to secure delay or to choose a forum”).
284 EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 971 (3d Cir. 1988).
285 Res judicata is a doctrine that bar claims that have been litigated or that could have been
litigated from being relitigated. A related doctrine, collateral estoppel, bars issues that have been
litigated from being relitigated. Whereas “res judicata operates only when there has been a prior
judgment on the merits,” collateral estoppel has “more limited preclusive effect,” barring only
re-litigation of issues actually litigated and necessary to holdings in the prior litigation. Keene
Corp. v. United States, 591 F. Supp. 1340, 1346 (D.D.C. 1984), aff’d sub nom. GAF Corp. v.
United States, 818 F.2d 901 (D.C. Cir. 1987).
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interest in a stable judicial system, one hallmark of which is that once determinations
about legal relations are set, they remain fixed.286
As far as rulings of law are concerned, district courts should employ a kind of
preclusion-light approach to avoid comity problems. By this, I mean that assessing the
relative progress of the same or similar cases entails looking at not just the date the
cases were filed or judgments entered, but, in some instances, will extend to looking
at decisions of law at the motion to dismiss and summary judgment stage, even if those
decisions would for the purposes of appeal be deemed interlocutory.
There are two good reasons for that approach in the nationwide injunction context.
First, where a coequal court has already reached a decision on the merits, even in an
interlocutory order, respect for the orderly administration of the federal judicial system
requires that its decision not be disturbed by a nationwide injunction issued by another
coequal court. That is because it is for the court of first instance to determine the
threshold legal question “and until its decision is reversed for error by orderly review,
either by itself or a high court, its order based on its decision is to be respected.”287 As
Justice Kennedy explained decades ago, “[w]hen an injunction sought in one federal
proceeding would interfere with another federal proceeding, considerations of comity
require more than the usual measure of restraint, and such injunctions should be
granted only in the most unusual cases.”288
Second, where there is some mutuality of parties, it is even more important that
courts give prior adjudications settling issues of law, such as issues of statutory
interpretation, even at preliminary stages like the motion to dismiss stage, preclusive
effect. While interlocutory orders issued by the first court may not be final in the sense
that they may be reconsidered by the first court or appealed later, they should not be
open to collateral attack in other fora.289 If the rule were otherwise, we would
perversely incentivize well-resourced parties to file successive overlapping suits to
relitigate key threshold questions of law, undermining the important policy that
litigation of issues at some point must come to an end.290

286 Cf. Kevin M. Clermont, Limiting the Last-in-Time Rule for Judgments, 36 REV. LIT. 1, 2
(2017) (making similar point to explain res judicata’s import).
287 Celotex Corp. v. Edwards, 514 U.S. 300, 313 (1995) (Rehnquist, J.) (quoting Walker v.
Birmingham, 388 U.S. 307, 314 (1967)).
288 Bergh v. Washington, 535 F.2d 505, 507 (9th Cir. 1976) (Kennedy, J.).
289 United States v. Stauffer Chem. Co., 464 U.S. 165, 171 (1984) (“In such a case, it is unfair
to the winning party and an unnecessary burden on the courts to allow repeated litigation of the
same issue in what is essentially the same controversy, even if the issue is regarded one of
‘law’.”).
290 James Talcott, Inc. v. Allahabad Bank, Ltd., 444 F.2d 451, 463 (5th Cir. 1971) (“[T]here
will always [be] a lingering question whether the party might have succeeded in proving his
point if he had only been given a second chance . . . . Without more, however, this question is
not sufficient to outweigh the extremely important policy underlying the doctrine of collateral
estoppel – that litigation of issues at some point must come to an end.”).
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Was Filing of Subsequent Suit Reactive

This factor directs district courts to assess whether the instant suit was filed
reactively in response to one or more earlier filed or more mature cases. It aims to
inoculate against litigants using nationwide injunction suits to procedurally fence or
relitigate an issue of law.
Under this factor, district courts should searchingly assess whether there is
evidence of reactivity. Among other things, courts may consider whether the instant
suit was filed after a same or similar case was filed, an adverse judgment on a common
or core issue of law was briefed or actually decided, a preliminary or permanent
injunction premised on a common core issue of law was entered, or final judgment
was entered.
If there is evidence of reactivity, this factor weighs strongly in favor of abstention.
A few interests and well-settled rules of adjudication support this. This kind of
balancing aligns with the rule that district courts lack the discretion to hear cases
within their jurisdiction where the claims seek relief from a judgment entered by a
coordinate court, when the parties can seek redress in the issuing court.291 Similarly,
equities and principles of judicial economy weigh heavily in favor of disallowing relitigation of threshold issues of law already decided in an earlier filed, still pending
suit from being relitigated in a later filed suit.292 Evidence of reactivity also supports
abstention given the strong interest in ensuring litigants have a single determination
of their controversy, rather than several decisions which, if they conflict, may require
separate appeals to different circuit courts of appeals.293 Indeed, abstention may, in
some reactive suits, be the only true means of protecting the parties and courts from
the possibility of conflicting orders and injunctions.294
Some circuits have already adopted a version of this factor. For instance, in United
States v. AMC Entertainment, the Ninth Circuit held that the district court abused its
discretion in issuing a nationwide injunction against AMC because it was

291 Feller v. Brock, 802 F.2d 722, 728 (4th Cir. 1986); Lapin v. Shulton, Inc., 333 F.2d 169,
172 (9th Cir. 1964) (declining relief to party to original action who sought relief from coordinate
rather than original court); Mann Mfg., Inc. v. Hortex, Inc., 439 F.2d 403, 408 n.5 (5th Cir.
1971) (quoting Lapin); Treadaway v. Acad. of Motion Picture Arts & Scis., 783 F.2d 1418,
1421 (9th Cir. 1986) (same); Carter v. Att’y Gen. of the U.S., 782 F.2d 138, 142 n.4 (10th Cir.
1986) (same); see also Goins v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 657 F.2d 62, 64 (4th Cir. 1981)
(applying Lapin principle in case where plaintiff in second action was neither party nor the
successor-in-interest of party in first action); Brittingham v. Commissioner, 451 F.2d 315, 316–
17 (5th Cir. 1971) (same); Exxon Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Energy, 594 F. Supp. 84, 89–90 (D.
Del. 1984) (same); Common Cause v. Jud. Ethics Comm., 473 F. Supp. 1251, 1253 (D.D.C.
1979) (same).
292 See, e.g., Sil-Flo, Inc. v. SFHC, Inc., 917 F.2d 1507, 1521 (10th Cir. 1990) (citing BlonderTongue Lab’ys, Inc. v. Univ. of Ill. Found., 402 U.S. 313, 334 (1971)) (“The requirement that
the party against whom the prior judgment is asserted had a full and fair opportunity to be heard
centers on the fundamental fairness of preventing the party from relitigating an issue [she] has
lost in a prior proceeding.”).
293 Chavez v. Dole Food Co., 796 F.3d 261, 267 (3d Cir. 2015) (quoting Crosley Corp. v.
Hazeltine Corp., 122 F.2d 925, 930 (3d Cir. 1941)).
294 See, e.g., EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 977 (3d Cir. 1988).
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geographically inappropriate in light of it covering areas in the Fifth Circuit, which
had already spoken on the issue of law at the heart of the injunction adversely.295 The
Ninth Circuit went on to explain that courts in the Ninth Circuit should not “grant
relief that would cause substantial interference with the established judicial
pronouncements of such sister circuits. To hold otherwise would create tension
between circuits and would encourage forum shopping.”296
D. Balancing Considerations
There are a handful of other hard rules that should govern the balancing process.
First and foremost, district courts must take care to consider the abstention factors
and reach a carefully considered judgment in writing explaining their reasons for
electing or declining to abstain.297 If the district court does not take into account the
abstention factors and reduce its rationales to writing, it has abused its discretion.298
Similarly, it is an abuse of discretion for the district court to not gather the necessary
information from the parties on which to assess the abstention factors.
Second, the balance should heavily weigh against exercise of jurisdiction. Several
reasons support this calibration. Where there are serious concerns about the propriety
of court intervention, district courts should decline their equitable jurisdiction.299
Additionally, because all injunctions are regarded as extraordinary remedies, the
default assumption should be that relief is not warranted.300 Because nationwide
injunctions, given their breadth, are even more extraordinary the balancing mechanism
should be calibrated to avoid exercise of jurisdiction that could give fruit to a
nationwide injunction.

295 United States v. AMC Ent., Inc., 549 F.3d 760, 770–73 (9th Cir. 2008).
296 Id.
297 Cf. Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 818–19 (1976)
(“[A] carefully considered judgment taking into account both the obligation to exercise
jurisdiction and the combination of factors counseling against that exercise is required.”).
298 The Fifth Circuit has adopted a similar rule in the declaratory judgment context. See
Travelers Ins. Co. v. La. Farm Bureau Fed’n, 996 F.2d 774, 778 (5th Cir. 1993) (citations
omitted) (“[U]nless the district court addresses and balances the purposes of the Declaratory
Judgment Act and the factors relevant to the abstention doctrine on the record, it abuses its
discretion.”).
299 See Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 43–44 (1971) (explaining that abstention is premised
on the “basic doctrine of equity jurisprudence that courts of equity should not act” in particular
situations); see also Providence Rubber Co. v. Goodyear, 76 U.S. (9 Wall.) 788, 805, 807 (1869)
(noting that equitable jurisdiction should be exercised in a manner that “protect[s] all rights and
do[es] justice to all concerned”).
300 See, e.g., Harrisonville v. W.S. Dickey Clay Mfg., Co., 289 U.S. 334, 337–38 (1933) (the
injunction “is not a remedy which issues as of course”); Yakus v. United States, 321 U.S. 414,
440 (1944) (“The award of an interlocutory injunction by courts of equity has never been
regarded as strictly a matter of right, even though irreparable injury may otherwise result to the
plaintiff”); Weinberger v. Romero-Barcelo, 456 U.S. 305, 313 (1982) (“[A] federal judge sitting
as chancellor is not mechanically obligated to grant an injunction for every violation of law.”).
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Third, the balancing factors should not be applied mechanically. Nationwide
injunctions create complicated problems for coordinate courts. As the Supreme Court
has recognized in other contexts where comity issues are at the fore, “[w]ise judicial
administration, giving regard to conservation of judicial resources and comprehensive
disposition of litigation, does not counsel rigid mechanical solution of such problems.
The factors relevant to wise administration here are equitable in nature. Necessarily,
an ample degree of discretion, appropriate for disciplined and experienced judges,
must be left to the lower courts.”301 Courts should thus not treat any single factor as a
“mandate directing wooden application of the rule without regard to rare or
extraordinary circumstances, inequitable conduct, bad faith, or forum shopping.
District courts have always had discretion to retain jurisdiction given appropriate
circumstances.”302
Beyond those hard rules, district courts should be afforded flexibility in balancing
the factors in light of the particular interests that predominate in the case.303 In some
cases, representativeness problems (factor three) may be so strong that, in combination
with weaker showings under other factors, abstention is necessary, at least until the
representativeness problem is resolved. In other cases, the reactivity of the suit (factor
seven) may predominate.
Where the district court determines that abstention is necessary, it should be
afforded considerable flexibility in deciding the parameters of its abstention. A few
options are available. It can totally decline to consider the request for a nationwide
injunction but retain jurisdiction over the case. Alternatively, it can delay considering
the request for a nationwide injunction until another court with priority acts first. Or,
in exceptional circumstances, the district court may dismiss the case outright.
E. Benefits of an Abstention Approach
There are several benefits to an abstention approach to nationwide injunctions.
One key strength of abstention is that it facilitates early intervention. Many of the
most pressing problems nationwide injunctions sow arise when a district court
exercises jurisdiction in the first instance, long before any remedy is awarded.
Abstention is ordered around that exact problem—it offers rough rules to manage
traffic as cases and claims pile up and allows district courts to pause or entirely duck
out of the dispute as necessary.
Another strength of abstention is its flexibility. The proposal directs district courts
to take a wholistic account of what is at stake, who is involved, and what relief is
sought in light of the case before it and the universe of other similar or overlapping
cases. There are few rules, and thus little incentive for district courts to try to hide

301 Kerotest Mfg., Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip., Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183–84 (1952).
302 EEOC v. Univ. of Pa., 850 F.2d 969, 972 (3d Cir. 1988).
303 Cf. Moses H. Cone Mem’l Hosp. v. Mercury Constr. Corp., 460 U.S. 1, 16 (1983) (holding
in context of Colorado River abstention that “[t]he weight to be given to any one factor may
vary greatly from case to case, depending on the particular setting of the case”).
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what they are actually doing,304 which should increase public confidence in the
nationwide injunctions that do issue.
The proposal also has practical value—it directs district courts to create a detailed
record that is designed to flush out nationwide injunction problems. This ensures a
record of district court’s considerations that an appellate court can review, facilitating
better assessment of whether the district court should have exercised jurisdiction and
as well as the merits of granting (or withholding) the remedy.
An additional benefit is that an abstention approach is responsive to, but does not
overcorrect for, the legitimacy problems imprudently granted nationwide injunctions
lay bare. Nationwide injunctions are constitutional,305 but the debate about their
propriety has placed considerable pressure on the judiciary to make a constitutional
account of their Article III powers.306 Judicial independence is fragile, politically
constructed, and historically contingent.307 The judiciary thus has an incentive to guard
against the isolated problems and abuses nationwide injunctions can sow308 in-house
given increased pressures on judicial independence. As Owen Fiss explains in context
of structural injunctions, it is better for the courts to tame remedies and inoculate
against abuses.309 This helps not only reassure the public of the remedy’s legitimacy,
but also helps the judiciary shore up its institutional legitimacy in the process.
Some other proposed solutions misdiagnose when and why nationwide injunctions
prove problematic. For instance, some commentators, citing isolated abuses, urge
nationwide injunctions be categorically barred.310 This is an overcorrection. Not all
nationwide injunctions have proved problematic.
Similarly flawed, some commentators suggest that the true problem with
nationwide injunctions is that they overly burden nonparties. Matthew Erickson’s
proposal falls in this camp.311 He suggests that courts adopt a three-factor test that
takes into account “who” benefits from injunctions sought and if there are a large

304 Cf. Jason Iuliano, The Supreme Court’s Noble Lie, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 911 (2018)
(arguing it would be better for the Supreme Court to stop claiming it is strictly abiding by legal
formalism when it is plain that realist considerations influence their rulings).
305 See discussion supra Part III.
306 See discussion supra Part II.
307 See generally Tara Leigh Grove, The Origins (and Fragility) of Judicial Independence, 71
VAND. L. REV. 465 (2018).
308 See discussion supra Section II.C.
309 Fiss, supra note 199, at 37 (“Consent can also be earned. But that takes time and thus
structural reform should be given a chance to operate—a so-called trial run (assuming the past
decade has not been sufficient). If it survives, it will then be given the same claim to legitimacy
as the so-called traditional model: the institution will have legitimated itself.”).
310 See, e.g., Bray, supra note 9, at 469.
311 Matthew Erickson, Who, What, Where: A Case for a Multifactor Balancing Test as a
Solution to Abuse of Nationwide Injunctions, 113 NW. U. L. REV. 331, 334–35 (2018).
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number of nonparty beneficiaries, a nationwide injunction is improper.312 This is also
an overcorrection. Injunctions that benefit a large number of nonparties are not
necessarily problematic.
Also misguided are commentators whose proposed solutions presume that the
scope of the remedy is the true problem and, based on that misdiagnosis, suggest that
we recalibrate the injunction factors. As one example, Zayn Siddique proposes that
we modify the injunction factors to codify the “complete relief” principle as a formal
limit on the appropriate geographic scope of an injunction.313 The proposal is premised
on the assumption that complete relief is a descriptively useful principle to categorize
the types of cases where nationwide injunctions tend to issue and that it could thus
function as a limiting principle. However, complete relief seems to be both a
misleading and incomplete standard. Complete relief does not seem to have a limiting
effect on the scope of injunctions where focus is not limited to an action’s effect solely
on parties before the court. As Ronald Cass argues, where political judgments are
“integrally related to the assessment of interests involved on both sides (for and against
the injunction), the standard of complete relief tilts remedies toward the political
forces opposing the government.”314 Cass also cautions that the inherent bias of the
complete relief standard can also exaggerate the bias baked into nationwide injunction
suits given the fact that the side seeking the injunction is likely to have forum-shopped
into a court it knows is likely to favor broader relief in the first instance—it thus leads
to a situation where there’s both an easier venue for the moving party and easier
standard for relief if that party prevails.315 Indeed, the Ninth Circuit pointed to this
problem in East Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, there reversing a nationwide
injunction on the logic that if “complete relief” were given too much weight, then “a
nationwide injunction would result any time an enjoined action has potential
nationwide effects. Such an approach would turn broad injunctions into the rule rather
than the exception.”316
Some other proposals miss the mark because they urge that courts rigidly classify
nationwide injunction suits by type and apply different rules to each kind of suit.
Michael Morely’s proposal is one such example.317 He suggests that we break
nationwide injunction suits into five discrete classes—plaintiff-oriented injunctions,
plaintiff-class injunctions, associational injunctions, defendant-oriented injunctions,
and defendant-class injunctions—and argues a different judicial approach is due to

312 Id. at 361 (arguing that courts should adopt a three-factor test that takes into account “who”
benefits from injunction sought and if there are a large number of nonparty beneficiaries a
nationwide injunction is improper).
313 Siddique, supra note 15, at 2139–47 (suggesting an amendment to Fed. R. Civ. P. 65 that
would codify the “complete relief principle”).
314 Ronald A. Cass, Nationwide Injunctions’ Governance Problems: Forum Shopping,
Politicizing Courts, and Eroding Constitutional Structure, 27 GEO. MASON L. REV. 29, 62
(2019).
315 Id. at 63.
316 E. Bay Sanctuary Covenant v. Barr, 934 F.3d 1026, 1029 (9th Cir. 2019).
317 Michael T. Morley, Disaggregating Nationwide Injunctions, 71 ALA. L. REV. 1 (2020).
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each.318 But proposals like Morley’s miss the mark because they conflict with the
Court’s recent equity precedents that abhor applying dispositive presumptions crafted
to deal with sub-classes of cases.319
Other proposed solutions suffer from being unrealistic to implement under current
conditions. One example is Judge Gregg Costa’s proposal, which suggests that
Congress pass legislation creating three-judge panels to hear nationwide injunction
suits and make those decisions immediately appealable to the Supreme Court.320
Similarly unrealistic is Zachary Clopton’s proposal.321 He suggests that the problems
nationwide injunctions pose for nonparties can be solved if traditional preclusion
principles are applied with the hefty caveat that this would require the Supreme Court
to modify or overrule United States v. Mendoza,322 which held that the federal
government is exempt from offensive nonmutual collateral estoppel, an exceedingly
unlikely proposition.323
F. Objections
Against this proposal at least three objections can be raised: one about
constitutionality, one about supposed limits on abstention violated by the proposal,
and one about whether it is appropriate for the Court to act or wait on Congress. Here,
I briefly explore each objection.
1.

Abstention is Unconstitutional

The concern that abstention is categorically improper has been floated in the
literature for some time. The primary charge is that abstention is unconstitutional.324
Proponents urge that federal courts must exercise the jurisdiction given to them by

318 Id. at 9–10.
319 See, e.g., Winter v. Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc., 555 U.S. 7 (2008); eBay Inc. v.
MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388 (2006).
320 Gregg Costa, An Old Solution to the Nationwide Injunction Problem, HARV. L. REV. BLOG
(Jan. 25, 2018), https://blog.harvardlawreview.org/an-old-solution-to-the-nationwideinjunction-problem/ [https://perma.cc/TP94-2XQL].
321 Zachary D. Clopton, National Injunctions and Preclusion, 118 MICH. L. REV. 1 (2019).
322 United States v. Mendoza, 464 U.S. 154 (1984).
323 Clopton, supra note 321, at 5.
324 The best critique of abstention is Martin Redish, Abstention, Separation of Powers, and the
Limits of the Judicial Function, 94 YALE L.J. 71, 72, 76, 82, 88, 114–15 (1984). For more on
the enduring legacy of Redish’s critique see generally William P. Marshall, Abstention,
Separation of Powers, and Recasting the Meaning of Judicial Restraint, 107 NW. U. L. REV.
881, 883, 892, 896–98 (2013) (suggesting that Redish’s critique has “changed the way that the
meaning of judicial restraint was conceptualized”); see also Linda S. Mullenix, A Branch Too
Far: Pruning the Abstention Doctrine, 75 GEO. L.J. 99, 156 (1986) (“[A]bstention for reasons
of wise judicial administration—is properly construed only as an unprincipled judicial self-help
remedy. It is judicial activism of the most blatant kind: a cynical disregard for clearly expressed
congressional intent that the federal courts exercise jurisdiction under circumstances that are
statutorily defined.”).
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Congress. That requirement, they reason, is baked into Article III, which gives
Congress the exclusive power to create and set the jurisdiction of inferior federal
courts.325 Because Congress alone sets jurisdiction, they urge that refusing to exercise
it to its fullest extent is tantamount to a “usurpation” of Congress’s authority.326 Often,
they point to Chief Justice Marshall’s opinion in Cohen v. Virginia for support. There,
Marshall opined that federal courts “have no more right to decline the exercise of
jurisdiction which is given than to usurp that which is not given. The one or the other
would be treason to the Constitution.”327
I do not think that the constitutional objection to abstention is insurmountable.
After Cohen, the Court has repeatedly recognized that “[t]he proposition that a court
having jurisdiction must exercise it, is not universally true.”328 When sitting in equity,
federal courts exercise jurisdiction subject to the ancient principles of equity which
inhere the “historic discretion” to abstain.329 The “power to abstain” is thus understood
to be baked into the grant of equitable jurisdiction.330 This is an “extraordinary and
narrow exception” to the rule that courts must typically exercise their full
jurisdiction.331 It is, as David Shapiro argues, a proper exercise of the judicial power
because “notions of reasoned judicial discretion are embodied in the very concept of
jurisdiction.”332
2.

No Federal-Federal Abstention Doctrines

Some might oppose the proposal on the pretense that abstention can only be
justified in rare circumstances where federalism concerns outweigh the imperative that
federal courts exercise the jurisdiction granted them by Congress. But there is no
325 See Patchak v. Zinke, 138 S. Ct. 897, 906 (2018) (reaffirming that Congress’s control of
federal courts’ jurisdiction is an essential component of separation of powers).
326 Redish, supra note 324, at 71, 72, 76, 82, 88, 114–15.
327 Cohens v. Virginia, 19 U.S. (6 Wheat.) 264, 404 (1821).
328 Can. Malting Co. v. Paterson S.S., Ltd., 285 U.S. 413, 422 (1932).
329 Id.; see also New Orleans Pub. Serv., Inc. v. Council of New Orleans, 491 U.S. 350, 359
(1989) (clarifying that there are some classes of cases where abstaining is the “normal thing to
do,” but that while abstention is permissible, it remains “the exception, not the rule”).
330 Quackenbush v. Allstate Ins. Co., 517 U.S. 706, 718 (1996) (recognizing that the “power
to abstain” is located “in the historic discretion exercised by federal courts ‘sitting in equity’”)
(citation omitted).
331 Allegheny Cnty. v. Frank Mashuda Co., 360 U.S. 185, 188–89 (1959) (“The doctrine of
abstention, under which a District Court may decline to exercise or postpone the exercise of its
jurisdiction, is an extraordinary and narrow exception to the duty of a District Court to
adjudicate a controversy properly before it. Abdication of the obligation to decide cases can be
justified under this doctrine only in exceptional circumstances.”).
332 David L. Shapiro, Jurisdiction and Discretion, 60 N.Y.U. L. REV. 543, 543 (1985); see also
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Why Abstention is Not Illegitimate: An Essay on the Distinction Between
“Legitimate” and “Illegitimate” Statutory Interpretation and Judicial Lawmaking, 107 NW. U.
L. REV. 847 (2013) (arguing that abstention can be justified under both textualist and purposivist
theories of statutory interpretation).
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Supreme Court precedent that sustains this argument. Rather, it is a rule wrongly
inferred from the handful of twentieth century cases where the Court identified
discrete instances in which abstention was appropriate. In each of those cases—
Pullman,333 Younger,334 Buford,335 and Thibodaux336—the Court justified abstention
on federalism grounds.337 Even though the Court has never explicitly articulated
principles to guide abstention where there is concurrent federal jurisdiction, that’s no
bar.
While state-federal conflicts are key features of most Supreme Court abstention
cases to date, there is good reason to believe the abstention power can be exercised in
other contexts. Principally, the kinds of abstention already recognized by the Court
fall within the ancient power but are not exhaustive. Indeed, in Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco,
Inc., the Court clarifies that “[t]he various types of abstention are not rigid pigeonholes
into which federal courts must try to fit cases. Rather, they reflect a complex of
considerations designed to soften the tensions inherent in a system that contemplates
parallel judicial processes.”338 In fact, the Court has long recognized that district courts
are empowered to invoke abstention in equity matters even if there is “no precise rule”

333 R.R. Comm’n of Tex. v. Pullman Co., 312 U.S. 496, 500–01 (1941) (“Few public interests
have a higher claim upon the discretion of a federal chancellor than the avoidance of needless
friction with state policies, whether the policy relates to the enforcement of criminal law, or the
administration of a specialized scheme for liquidating embarrassed business enterprises, or the
final authority of a state court to interpret doubtful regulatory laws of the state. These cases
reflect a doctrine of abstention appropriate to our federal system whereby the federal courts,
‘exercising a wise discretion’, restrain their authority because of ‘scrupulous regard for the
rightful independence of the state governments’ and for the smooth working of the federal
judiciary.” (citations omitted)).
334 Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37, 44 (1971) (“This underlying reason for restraining courts
of equity from interfering with criminal prosecutions is reinforced by an even more vital
consideration, the notion of ‘comity’, that is, a proper respect for state functions, a recognition
of the fact that the entire country is made up of a Union of separate state governments, and a
continuance of the belief that the National Government will fare best if the States and their
institutions are left free to perform their separate functions in their separate ways.”).
335 Burford v. Sun Oil Co., 319 U.S. 315, 317–18 (1943) (“Although a federal equity court
does have jurisdiction of a particular proceeding, it may, in its sound discretion, whether its
jurisdiction is invoked on the ground of diversity of citizenship or otherwise, ‘refuse to enforce
or protect legal rights, the exercise of which may be prejudicial to the public interest’; for it ‘is
in the public interest that federal courts of equity should exercise their discretionary power with
proper regard for the rightful independence of state governments in carrying out their domestic
policy.’” (citations omitted)).
336 La. Power & Light Co. v. City of Thibodaux, 360 U.S. 25, 29 (1959) (“The justification for
this power, to be exercised within indicated limits, lies in regard for the respective competence
of the state and the federal court systems and for the maintenance of harmonious federal-state
relations in a matter close to the political interests of a State.”).
337 See Gardner, supra note 238, at 74 (characterizing mid-twentieth century abstention
doctrines as devised “primarily to protect state interests from federal encroachment”).
338 Pennzoil Co. v. Texaco, Inc., 481 U.S. 1, 11 n.9 (1987).

https://engagedscholarship.csuohio.edu/clevstlrev/vol69/iss4/7

66

2021]

THE CHANCELLORS ARE ALRIGHT

925

that applies.339 The Court has also recognized in dicta that abstention may be
appropriate where there is concurrent federal jurisdiction. For instance, in Colorado
River the Court acknowledges that “there are principles unrelated to considerations of
proper constitutional adjudication and regard for federal-state relations which govern
in situations involving the contemporaneous exercise of concurrent jurisdictions,
either by federal courts or by state and federal courts.”340 The Court goes on to
recognize that federal district courts had for some time abstained in the context of
federal-federal conflicts.341
Beyond that, it is unproblematic for district courts to exercise their discretion to
abstain in the nationwide injunction context because, sounding in equity, a party that
invokes the court’s jurisdiction and asks it to exercise discretion to afford particular
relief is bound by that court’s discretionary decisions.342 Thus, parties that file
nationwide injunction suits seeking district courts to exercise their discretion to afford
broad nationwide relief are legitimately bound by that same court’s discretionary
decision to not hear the case at all.
3.

Deference to Congress

Another likely objection to my proposal is that it would be better for Congress to
act on nationwide injunctions, either passing legislation barring the remedy outright
or perhaps creating a three-judge panel system like that suggested by Judge Costa.343
The exact solution is not so important here as is the idea that the judiciary should yield
to Congress and, in the interim, not try to fix the injunction problem in-house. While
it might in some ways be sensible for Congress to act, the judiciary’s hands are not
tied in the interim.
The beauty of the abstention proposal is that it allows the judiciary to act now but
does not foreclose Congress from stepping in later. Indeed, it leaves room for Congress
to ratify or nullify later. This could be justified, as part of a dialogic approach that
permits the Supreme Court and Congress, working together, to adjust jurisdictional
lines to take account of changing conceptions of the roles of lower federal courts and
the Court in our constitutional system. As Barry Friedman explains in another context,
even if Congress should take the lead, there is no clear bar forbidding Congress from
“obtaining the assistance of the federal courts in performing this function, or from
acquiescing in Supreme Court decisions if the Court takes the lead.”344 Of course, the
Court’s power to speak first on the issue would not necessarily thwart later efforts to

339 Colo. River Water Conservation Dist. v. United States, 424 U.S. 800, 817 (1976) (citing
Kerotest Mfg. Co. v. C-O-Two Fire Equip. Co., 342 U.S. 180, 183 (1952); Landis v. N. Am.
Co., 299 U.S. 248, 254 (1936)).
340 Id.
341 Id. (citing Kerotest Mfg., 342 U.S. at 183; Steelman v. All Continent Corp., 301 U.S. 278
(1937); Landis, 299 U.S. at 254).
342 See Hoffman v. Blaski, 363 U.S. 335, 347–50 (1960) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting).
343 Costa, supra note 320.
344 Barry Friedman, A Different Dialogue: The Supreme Court, Congress, and Federal
Jurisdiction, 85 NW. U. L. REV. 1, 59 (1990).
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compel exercise of jurisdiction. If Congress nullified the abstention proposal, courts
should not willfully refuse Congress’s explicit jurisdictional command.345
V. CONCLUSION
Anxieties about nationwide injunctions reached a fever-pitch under the Trump
administration. But the increased frequency with which the remedy is issued by federal
courts is not evidence of judicial overreach. In the vast majority of cases, federal
judges are exercising their conscience within the metes and bounds of Article III’s
equity, tailoring remedies to protect the parties where law falls short and, in cases
against the government, checking overreach, just as the Framers intended. Simply put:
The chancellors are alright.
As this Article has revealed, the constitutional argument against nationwide
injunctions—that their illegitimacy is proved by the fact that they were unknown to
the English Chancellor at the time the Constitution was ratified—totally lacks merit.
While our equity is in some respects informed by tradition, the Framers did not intend
for Article III to import the idiosyncratic limits of the English Chancellor. Our equity
extends as far as necessary to ensure justice to the parties. It evolves to meet modern
needs. When federal courts, past and present, invoke the English Chancellor, he is a
symbolic figure that embodies equity’s aspirational aims since time immemorial. The
ahistoric chancellor embodies equity’s overarching commitments to justice and
fairness. He also represents a promise by our modern-day chancellors that their
conscience is guided by a measure of stability and capacity for change that are
characteristic of equity’s long tradition. The novelty critique of nationwide injunctions
fails for another reason: the remedy is not even particularly new. Nationwide
injunctions have been part of federal equity practice for more than a century, bringing
them well within our tradition, just as Grupo Mexicano commands.346 Moreover,
although there are isolated problems and abuses sown by nationwide injunctions, these
issues are not explained by the remedy’s relative novelty and would not be solved by
eliminating it.
When the time comes, the Supreme Court should deem the nationwide injunction
within the metes and bounds of Article III. But it need not and should not stop there.
The Trump administration was so successful in using the nationwide injunction debate
to smear the judiciary that it behooves the Court to use its nationwide injunction
decision to help shore up public confidence in the courts. As I suggest here, this could
be achieved by adopting a nationwide injunction abstention doctrine. The abstention
doctrine proposed in this Article serves several purposes. As a practical matter, it gives
flexible guidance to the lower courts, helping them decide whether it is prudent to
exercise jurisdiction over nationwide injunction-type suits early on in the process. If
adopted widely, the abstention approach should inoculate against the most
troublesome problems nationwide injunctions can sow. An additional benefit is that
an abstention approach is directly responsive to, but does not overcorrect for, the
legitimacy problems imprudently granted nationwide injunctions lay bare.

345 William M. Richman & William L. Reynolds, Elitism, Expediency, and the New Certiorari:
Requiem for the Learned Hand Tradition, 81 CORNELL L. REV. 273, 327 n.258 (1996).
346 Sohoni, supra note 17, at 928.
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